



Response Date: 19/05/2026

2026/436 - AI usage

In response to your recent request for information regarding;

I am writing to request information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 regarding your force's use of generative artificial intelligence tools — including but not limited to Microsoft Copilot, OpenAI ChatGPT, Google Gemini, and Anthropic Claude — by officers or staff for any purpose connected to operational policing.

This request relates specifically to generative AI / large language model tools. It does not cover other forms of AI such as facial recognition technology, predictive analytics, or automated data matching, which are outside the scope of this request.

I request disclosure of the following recorded information:

1. Policies and governance

- (a) Copies of all policies, standard operating procedures, guidance documents, or directives — whether issued at force level or adopted from national guidance — that govern the use of generative AI tools by officers or staff, in force since 1 January 2023.**
(b) If no such policy or guidance exists, please confirm this.

The policy can be found attached to a previous FOI response:

[2026-285--use-of-artificial-intelligence-and-automated-decision-making-systems-within-the-police-force.docx.pdf](#)

2. Risk assessments and compliance

- (a) Copies of any Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) completed in relation to the use of generative AI tools by officers or staff for any purpose, including administrative, investigative, or operational tasks.**
(b) If no DPIA has been completed for any generative AI tool, please confirm this.

North Wales Police do not hold any information in relation to this part of your request. There are no DPIA's which have been completed for any generative AI tools.

3. Deployed tools and licensing

- (a) A list of any generative AI tools (including products bundled within existing software suites, such as Microsoft Copilot within Microsoft 365) that have been made available to officers or staff, and the date from which each tool was made available.**
(b) Whether access to any generative AI tool has been suspended or restricted since 1 January 2023, and if so, which tool, on what date, and any recorded reason for the suspension or restriction.

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Glan-y-Don, Bae Colwyn LL29 8AW
www.heddlugogleddcymru.police.uk

Police Headquarters,
Glan-y-Don, Colwyn Bay LL29 8AW
www.northwales.police.uk

Access is currently blocked due to ethical considerations but is currently under review still pending outcome.

4. Training

(a) Whether any training, e-learning, briefing, or written guidance on the use, limitations, or risks of generative AI tools has been provided to officers or staff, and if so, the date it was first made available.

Talks given to all senior management teams.

(b) Whether completion of such training is mandatory before officers or staff may use generative AI tools, or whether it is optional or advisory.

It will be should LLM tools be made available.

(c) The number of officers and staff who have completed such training, if this figure is recorded, and the total number of officers and staff who currently have access to one or more generative AI tools.

0 - N/A.

(d) If no training has been provided, please confirm this.

Training on the dangers of AI has been given. Thus use of is not yet allowed.

5. Incident recording and quality assurance

(a) The number of occasions, if recorded, on which output from a generative AI tool used by officers or staff was subsequently identified as containing factual inaccuracies, fabricated information, or material errors – whether identified internally or by an external party – since 1 January 2023.

(b) If no such records are held, please confirm this.

None used or recorded.

6. Audits and reviews

(a) Copies of any audit, review, or evaluation – whether conducted internally or by an external body – of the force's use of generative AI tools.

(b) If no audit or review has been conducted, please confirm this.

None used, still under review.

The responses provided are in relation to overt use, North Wales Police can neither confirm nor deny that it holds any information in relation to the covert practice of facial recognition as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 24(2) National Security

Section 31(3) Law Enforcement

With Sections 24 and 31 being prejudice based qualified exemptions, there exists the requirement to articulate the harm that would be caused in confirming or not whether information is held as well as carrying out a public interest test.

Having disclosed high-level information about routine, non-sensitive uses of Artificial Intelligence (AI), North Wales Police will neither confirm nor deny whether it holds any further information that would indicate whether AI is, or is not, used in connection with counter-terrorism, serious and organised crime, covert intelligence activity, or specialist digital forensics supporting those functions. The duty to confirm or deny is disapplied by virtue of sections 24(2) (national security)

and 31(3) (law enforcement) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000. This response should not be taken as an indication of whether any additional information is held.

Confirming or denying whether AI is used by North Wales Police in counter-terrorism, serious and organised crime, covert intelligence or specialist digital forensics would enable hostile actors to infer the presence, absence or maturity of particular policing capabilities. This type of capability insight is of practical value to adversaries who routinely adapt their behaviour to exploit perceived weaknesses, overwhelm less technologically equipped forces, or adjust methods to avoid detection. Even a single confirmation or denial could be combined with publicly available information from other forces to build a detailed national picture of capability. This mosaic effect represents a realistic and actionable risk, providing information that could materially undermine national security and the effectiveness of law-enforcement operations.

Public Interest Test – Section 24(2) (National Security)

Factors in favour of confirming or denying - There is a strong public interest in openness and transparency about the use of AI in policing. Confirming or denying the existence of information could contribute to informed public debate about how emerging technologies are deployed, the safeguards in place, and whether they align with legal and ethical standards. Disclosure can enhance accountability, promote trust, and reassure the public that AI use is subject to appropriate oversight.

Factors against confirming or denying - There is an overriding public interest in protecting national security. Confirming or denying the existence of information about AI deployment in CT, SoC, covert intelligence, or linked specialist forensics would provide adversaries with useful insights into operational capabilities and priorities. Even a simple confirmation or denial could enable hostile actors to adjust methods, exploit potential gaps, or test thresholds. The resulting risk to national security would be real and more than trivial, and is not mitigated by partial or local confirmations, because the cumulative mosaic effect across multiple forces would still disclose sensitive capability at a national level.

Public Interest Test – Section 31(3) (Law Enforcement)

Factors in favour of confirming or denying - There is a general public interest in understanding how AI is used to support policing functions, including the efficiency and effectiveness of core processes, and in ensuring that novel technologies are used lawfully and proportionately. Confirmation or denial could support external scrutiny and promote confidence in policing practice.

Factors against confirming or denying - Confirming or denying the existence of information relating to AI use in CT, SoC, covert intelligence, or specialist digital forensics would be likely to prejudice the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension or prosecution of offenders, and the operation of law enforcement tactics and methodologies. Knowledge of whether specific capabilities exist, or do not exist, enables offenders to adapt behaviour, exploit capability gaps, frustrate investigations, and increase the cost and complexity of counter-measures. The public interest strongly favours maintaining an NCND to preserve the effectiveness of law enforcement and the safety of the public.

Balance Test

For the reasons set out above, North Wales Police will neither confirm nor deny whether it holds information indicating AI is used in CT, SoC, covert intelligence activity, or specialist digital forensics supporting those functions.

The public interest in maintaining the NCND position under sections 24(2) and 31(3) outweighs the public interest in confirmation or denial. This response should not be taken as an indication of whether any relevant information is held.

A separate response has already provided high-level information about routine, non-sensitive AI use. To go further would risk disclosing sensitive capability by inference.

Therefore, in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act 2000, this letter acts as a Refusal Notice under section 17 (1) of the legislation.

THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST
UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000, AND IS CORRECT AS AT 14/05/2026