



Response Date:20/03/2026

2026/339 - Motor Insurance Database Vehicle Records

In response to your recent request for information regarding;

Please provide the list of vehicle registration numbers currently recorded on the Motor Insurance Database (MID) for vehicles insured by your force.

This request relates solely to the vehicle registration numbers recorded for insurance purposes and does not seek any operational deployment information, tactical capability data, or information relating to the use of specific vehicles.

If the information is held as part of an administrative insurance record or fleet insurance schedule, I would be content to receive the information in any readily available format such as a spreadsheet, CSV export, or similar list.

If any individual vehicles are considered sensitive for operational reasons, I would ask that those specific entries be withheld where strictly necessary and that the remainder of the information be disclosed.

Harm has been identified in providing you with any details relating to the VRM of all police vehicles. A Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself, and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication. This is because, under Freedom of Information, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world and not just to one individual.

Therefore, Section 31 (1) Law Enforcement and Section 24 (1) National Security are to be considered as part of the Public Interest Test. A Public Interest Test has been carried out to weigh up the reasons for and against disclosure of the information requested, to ensure the release is in the interest of the public as a whole and not just the applicant.

Harm

Disclosure of detailed fleet information such as VRNs would be of intelligence value to individuals or groups with criminal or malicious intent. While VRNs are visible on public roads, publishing a ready-collated list of all fleet details provides a far greater level of insight than is realistically accessible to the public. This would allow offenders to:

- Clone VRNs to avoid tolls, congestion charges, or commit offences while appearing legitimate.
- Identify specialist vehicles (e.g., Armed Response or Roads Policing Units) and adapt tactics to evade or target them.
- Compromise covert operations by making unmarked vehicles easier to identify.
- Exploit post-service risks, as many police vehicles are sold at auction; knowledge of specifications and VRNs could enable impersonation of officers or misuse of residual equipment.
- Reverse engineer security systems: This means studying ex-police vehicles to learn how their security features work—such as wiring, electronics, or software—and using that knowledge to copy, bypass, or exploit those systems in active vehicles.

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Glan-y-Don, Bae Colwyn LL29 8AW
www.heddlugogleddcymru.police.uk

Police Headquarters,
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- Build a national mosaic picture of fleet composition and operational strength, undermining law enforcement capability.

Public Interest Test

S24(1) - Factors favouring disclosure: Disclosure would promote transparency and accountability in how public funds are spent on fleet procurement. It may also increase public confidence in policing by demonstrating openness and supporting informed public debate about resource allocation.

S24(1) - Factors favouring non-disclosure: Detailed fleet information could assist hostile actors in targeting law enforcement vehicles, which would undermine national security. Disclosure could facilitate reverse engineering of security systems, significantly increasing the risk of exploitation by organised crime or terrorist groups.

S31(1) - Factors favouring disclosure: Disclosure would reassure the public that police forces maintain appropriate vehicles and resources to deliver services effectively. It could also demonstrate that public funds are being used responsibly and that vehicles are fit for purpose.

S31(1) - Factors favouring non-disclosure: Releasing detailed fleet information, including VRNs would provide criminals with a tactical advantage by revealing operational capabilities and specialist resources.

It could compromise covert policing and allow offenders to take steps to evade detection or destroy evidence. Disclosure would also increase the risk of police impersonation, particularly where decommissioned vehicles are sold at auction, and could lead to the misuse of residual equipment or reverse-engineering of security systems.

These risks would undermine law enforcement effectiveness and negatively impact public safety.

Balance Test:

The public interest in transparency does not outweigh the substantial risk of harm caused by disclosure.

Publishing detailed fleet specifications would allow those with criminal or hostile intent to build a mosaic picture of police capabilities, evade detection, and exploit vulnerabilities. This risk extends beyond law enforcement tactics to national security: aggregated data could assist organised crime or hostile actors in targeting specialist vehicles, exploit cyber vulnerabilities, and undermining emergency response at scale.

Such outcomes would compromise policing operations, increase risks to officers and the public, and require significant resources to counteract the harm. Therefore, disclosure is not in the public interest.

In accordance with the Freedom of Information Act 2000, this letter acts as a Refusal Notice under section 17 (1) of the legislation.

THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST
UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000, AND IS CORRECT AS AT 18/03/2026