



**HEDDLU
GOGLEDD CYMRU
NORTH WALES
POLICE**

Response Date: 23/10/2025

2025/1085 - Correspondence

In response to your recent request for information regarding;

I am writing to request all written digital correspondence between (1) your force's team responsible for addressing and responding to freedom of information requests and (2) the National Police Chiefs' Council's (NPCC) central referral unit (CRU) in September 2025.

I appreciate that parts of the correspondence will need to be redacted, but would remind that redaction does not count towards the time/cost limits under s12 of the FOIA. The possibility that parts of the correspondence will need to be redacted also does not justify withholding the correspondence in its entirety

Please find attached all emails sent between the National Police Chiefs' Council's (NPCC) central referral unit (CRU) and our Freedom of Information Team during September 2025.

Names have been removed as to disclose them would be a breach of the Data Protection Act, these are exempt under Section 40 (2) of the Freedom of Information Act. Therefore, in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act 2000, this letter acts as a Refusal Notice under section 17 (1) of the legislation.

Concerns have been raised in providing the email address of the National Police Chiefs' Council's (NPCC) central referral unit email address and information which relate to security bodies. A Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself, and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication. This is because, under Freedom of Information, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world and not just to one individual.

Therefore, Section 31 (1) Law Enforcement and Section 23 (1) Security Bodies is to be considered as part of the Public Interest Test. A Public Interest Test has been carried out to weigh up the reasons for and against disclosure of the information requested, to ensure the release is in the interest of the public as a whole and not just the applicant.

Section s31(1) Law Enforcement
Section 23 (1) Information Supplied by , or concerning certain security bodies

Section 31 (1) is a prejudice based qualified exemption, therefore there is a requirement to articulate the harm that would be caused in confirming or not that the information is held as well as carrying out a public interest test.
Section 23 (1) is an absolute exemption, therefore there is no requirement to conduct a public interest test.

Pencadlys yr Heddlu,
Glan-y-Don, Bae Colwyn LL29 8AW
www.heddlugogleddcymru.police.uk

Police Headquarters,
Glan-y-Don, Colwyn Bay LL29 8AW
www.northwales.police.uk

**Yn gwneud Gogledd Cymru'r lle mwyaf diogel i fyw, gweithio ac ymweld yn y DU
Making North Wales the safest place to live, work and visit in the UK**

The Harm Test process requires North Wales Police to consider any possible harm that might arise as a result of placing the requested information into the public domain. This process considers the potential harm to:

- Individuals
- The community as a whole
- North Wales Police and the wider policing service
- Other bodies

Harm in respect of s31(1) Law Enforcement

North Wales Police are charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve.

While we appreciate you will have no ill meaning behind your request, disclosure of the National Police Chiefs' Council's (NPCC) central referral unit email address could result in it being used by those with criminal intent to undermine policing efforts. If the mailbox was bombarded with email this could result in emails from Forces getting missed and advice not being provided, potentially relating to national issues where we have to respond the same to ensure the safety of the public.

Public Interest Test:

Factors favouring Disclosure – the whole purpose of the Freedom of Information Act is to ensure transparency therefore providing the email address would show where we contact for advice.

Factors favouring Non-Disclosure – providing the email address into the public domain could result in the CRU becoming less effective due to additional unnecessary emails being received or used by those with the necessary criminal intent

Balance Test

The strongest reason favouring disclosure is increasing public knowledge of where we receive advice from and North Wales Police being open and transparent.

The strongest reason favouring non-disclosure is to not undermine the work of the CRU by virtue of an adverse FOIA disclosure.

On weighing up the competing interests I have determined that the disclosure of the above information would not be in the public interest. I consider that the benefit that would result from the information being disclosed does not outweigh the considerations favouring non-disclosure. A generic name can be provided therefore it is obvious where the email is from however the exact email address would not be in the public interest.

In accordance with the Freedom of Information Act 2000, this letter acts as a Refusal Notice under section 17 (1) of the legislation.

THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST
UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000, AND IS CORRECT AS AT 21/10/2025

[REDACTED]

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox [REDACTED]
Sent: 11 September 2025 11:57
Subject: CRU 01/CRF/25/005157/H - Pro-Palestine Protests/Arrests - Advice Included
Categories: [REDACTED]

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. Advice is at the end of this message.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005157/H
Referred by: National

Applicant's request:

- 1 - How many people have been arrested by police at or in connection to pro-Palestine protests since the October 7 Attacks in 2023? Please provide the number of people arrested broken down by age.
- 2 - What offences were these people arrested for? Please include the breakdown of the number of people arrested for each type of offence (e.g. supporting a proscribed organisation, assault on officer, public order offence).
- 3 - How many people were detained in custody following these arrests? Please provide the breakdown of the number detentions in custody for each type of offence.
- 4 - How many people were charged with the offence they were arrested for? Please provide the breakdown of the number of people charged for each type of offence/charge.

CRU Advice:

We apologise for the delays in our advice at present.

It is likely that this request will engage s12 cost for quite a few forces, and if this is the case for your force we are content for you to proceed with this exemption.

However for those forces that have been able to locate the information within cost we would advise to consider the below:

Q1 – Although the breakdown of age has been requested, due to the wording we feel that the ages could be broken down in to age brackets in a different chart for the response, for example 20-29 years, 30-39 years etc. If this is done and you have locally assessed s31 law enforcement and s40 for personal details then these figures can be considered for disclosure.

Q2 – Q4, Similarly if these details are grouped into different charts and you have locally assessed s31 and s40 we see no harm in these figures being considered for disclosure.

If you need any further advice, please let us know

Kind Regards

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(Pronoun: she/her [why have I put this?](#))

NPFDU FOI Referral Officer

National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit | National Police Chiefs Council

,NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

* [Redacted]

' Via MS Teams

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox [REDACTED]
Sent: 15 September 2025 14:45
Subject: CRU 01/CRF/25/005191/J - Supreme Court ruling Documents - National - Advice Included

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. Advice is at the end of this message.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005191/J
Referred by: National

Applicant's request:

Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, I request the following information held by Northumbria Police from 1 January 2020 to the present:

1. Equality Act 2010 Compliance and Supreme Court Ruling

- a. Copies of all policies, operational guidance, Equality Impact Assessments (EQIAs), or internal communications updated or reviewed following the UK Supreme Court judgment of 16 April 2025 (For Women Scotland Ltd v Scottish Ministers), which confirmed that the protected characteristic of "sex" in the Equality Act 2010 refers to biological sex.
- b. Any legal advice, risk assessments, or internal discussions on Northumbria Police's obligations under this ruling.
- c. Steps taken (or planned) to ensure that custody suites, search procedures, detention practices, safeguarding arrangements, and staff facilities comply with the biological definition of sex.
- d. Explanations where Northumbria Police has not acted, including the legal or policy rationale.

2. Safeguarding, Compelled Belief, and Workforce Policies

- a. Documents relating to how Northumbria Police ensures safeguarding obligations are met in light of the above judgment, particularly in custody and frontline operations.
- b. Any HR, workforce, or diversity/equality policies since 2020 referring to "gender identity," "gender reassignment," or compelled speech/belief requirements.
- c. Complaints, grievances, or misconduct cases concerning staff raising concerns about:
 - Compelled belief or pronoun policies,
 - Freedom of speech or belief,
 - Suppression of lawful gender-critical views.
- d. Correspondence with the College of Policing, NPCC, or Home Office on these matters.

3. Immigration Enforcement and Border Duties

- a. Records of collaboration with the Home Office, UK Visas & Immigration (UKVI), or Border Force concerning immigration enforcement or cross-border operations with Police Scotland since 2020.

- b. Internal procedures for identifying, reporting, and processing individuals suspected of being unlawfully resident, particularly in custody, stop-and-search, or safeguarding contexts.
- c. Data held on cases where non-UK nationals accessed police services or victim support while immigration eligibility or status checks were unresolved.
- d. Any memoranda of understanding (MoUs) or operational agreements with Police Scotland on land-border policing and information sharing.

4. Costs, Fraud, and Audit

- a. Any internal analysis, audits, or reports on resource impact arising from immigration enforcement duties, non-UK national service users, or safeguarding failures since 2020.
- b. Records of suspected or confirmed fraud, false documentation, or misuse of public resources uncovered by Northumbria Police in relation to immigration or identity checks.
- c. Whether Northumbria Police tracks the effect of inappropriate eligibility or unlawful residency on frontline resourcing, custody capacity, or safeguarding outcomes.

5. Governance, Oversight, and Public Confidence

- a. Records of communications with the Home Office, NPCC, HMICFRS, or other oversight bodies regarding risks to legality, safeguarding, or public confidence.
- b. Any complaints, FOIs, whistleblower alerts, or media enquiries since 2023 relating to Equality Act compliance, safeguarding, compelled belief, or immigration enforcement.
- c. Northumbria Police's position on accountability: what concrete steps will be taken to address failings (if identified) and by what timescale.

Format, Redactions & Exemptions

If you consider that any exemptions (e.g. s.24, s.30, s.31, s.38, s.40, s.43) apply, please:

1. Identify each exemption per item;
2. Provide the public-interest test where relevant; and
3. Release all non-exempt material in redacted/partial form with redaction reasons noted in a schedule.

Section 16 FOIA – Duty to Advise and Assist

If any part risks exceeding the cost limit, please process the remainder and advise how to refine scope (e.g., limit by year, operation type, or category).

This request is made in the public interest to ensure Northumbria Police complies with binding Supreme Court rulings, the Equality Act 2010, safeguarding duties, immigration law, and public resource accountability in the border zone.

CRU Advice:

This request as noted by several forces is requesting an extensive amount of information and will require each force to check with a variety of departments within their force to obtain the material required. Once the material is obtained it will need to be thoroughly locally assessed for s31 considerations.

Therefore it is highly likely that this will be a s12 response for most, if not all forces. If this is the case for your force we are content for you to respond as such and then guide the applicant in how best to revise their request to fit below the cost level.

Should your force have been able to obtain all the documentation required and already locally assessed for s31 considerations, please let us know what you hold and your business leads comments and we can advise further for you.

Kind regards

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(Pronoun: she/her [why have I put this?](#))

NPFDU FOI Referral Officer

National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit | National Police Chiefs Council

,NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

* [REDACTED]

' Via MS Teams

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox [REDACTED] >
Sent: 02 September 2025 12:50
Subject: CRU ref: 25/5103/T - Software Products used in Operations and Investigations - Including advice

OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. Advice is at the end of this message.

Our reference: 25/5103/T
Referred by: National

Applicant's request:

A list of all software products and services used in operations by the force between 1 January 2023 and 31 July 2025, including those products and services procured under the Strategic Partnership Arrangement 2024 (SPA24) and the Digital Transformation Arrangement 21 (DTA21), as well as other routes, such as RM6098 and through Crown Commercial Services

Clarification from applicant

To clarify, by "services" I'm referring only to software, and by "operations" I'm referring only to policing enforcement and investigation activities, such as public order events and criminal investigations."

CRU Advice:

As the question asks specifically for software *used in investigations* over the given time period, it is our belief that the request will exceed the cost limits of the act. We feel it's unlikely your systems will be formatted in a way that will make location and retrieval of the information possible without a manual review of each and every criminal investigation that has taken place in a 2.5 year period across the entire force.

If s12 is relevant then we see no issue in responding that way. Where you deem it feasible to do so we recommend you advise the applicant how best to refine their request.

If cost is not a factor for your force, please let us know. In such a case, and as you will be aware, the CRU have previously provided guidance on certain types of software which are not suitable for release. However in order to advise accurately how to answer this request where cost is not relevant, we would need to know what is held by forces. Any comments made by your force IT teams identifying harm would also be helpful if obtained.

Therefore, if you are not issuing a s12 cost refusal, please come back to the CRU with the above information and we will aim to assist further.

Kind regards

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox [REDACTED] >
Sent: 04 September 2025 12:31
Subject: CRU ref: 25/5136/C - Abduction and kidnap statistics - Including Advice

OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. Advice is at the end of this message. We believe this request has been circulated nationally and as such advice is being provided on that basis. There is no need to let us know you have this request unless you have a specific query about it which is not answered within the below advice.

Our reference: 25/5136/C
Referred by: Dorset Police

Applicant's request:

I'm writing to you to request data on police recorded offences of child abduction and kidnapping for the latest financial year 2024/25.

Specifically, I'd be very grateful if you could supply the following information:

1. From 1 April 2024 to 31 March 2025, how many crimes¹ of child abduction by a parent (Home Office classification² 13/01) were recorded in Dorset Police?
2. From 1 April 2024 to 31 March 2025, how many crimes¹ of child abduction by other persons (Home Office classification² 13/02) were recorded in Dorset Police?
3. From 1 April 2024 to 31 March 2025, how many crimes¹ of kidnapping (Home Office classification² 36/01) – when the victim was aged under 18 at the time of the offence – were recorded in Dorset Police? Please note: I only want to collect data on 36/01 offences; not the other 36 sub-categories (36/02, 36/03, 36/04 etc.).

For each of these three figures (questions 1, 2 and 3 above) please can you indicate how many of the offences were flagged as Child Sexual Abuse, and how many were flagged as Child Sexual Exploitation³.

¹I'm looking for information on crimes recorded rather than 'incidents'.

²Home Office classification number refers to the Counting Rules:

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counting-rules-for-recorded-crime>

³As per Home Office Counting Rules (2024/25), page 26:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67ee9b2a199d1cd55b48c769/crime-recording-rules-for-frontline-officers-and-staff-2025_26-april-2025-update.pdf

CRU Advice:

Advice is provided with the usual s12 and s21 considerations in mind.

For the statistical data requested, local assessment to ensure disclosure would not identify an individual or undermine an investigation is advised.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Kind regards

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council

[Redacted]



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From: NPCC CRU Mailbox <[REDACTED]>
Sent: 12 September 2025 08:33
Subject: CRU ref: 25/5142/A - DPIA's - Including Advice

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. Advice is at the end of this message.

Our reference: 25/5142/A

Referred by: All forces

Applicant's request:

- A complete list of Data Protection Impact Assessments produced by your force in the past five years.

CRU Advice:

The applicant is asking for a list of DPIA's produced in the last 5 years by your force. We are interpreting the request as only asking for a list of titles and not for full copies of the DPIA's in question. It may be the case that you do not hold an actual list already in a recorded form. However, in such a case we would expect the ICO to support a force compiling the information they held into a list format for disclosure. In other words, even if you don't hold an actual list as specifically recorded information, compiling a list to answer this FOI would not, in our view, be considered creating information thus we would not expect this scenario to result in a force issuing a NIH response.

As with any request, cost should be the first consideration. If to locate and retrieve all the requested information would exceed the cost limits of the act, s12 should be used. When issuing your refusal notice we recommend you notify the applicant how best to refine their request, if feasible to do so.

We are aware that s14 is being considered in at least one instance. Any application of s14 is ultimately for the force to decide upon, but as it is only a list of titles and not full copies of the DPIA's, then our initial thoughts are that s14(1) vexatious – overly burdensome, may stand up less well to scrutiny than if, say, full DPIA's were being requested. As stated though, it depends on individual force circumstances and what is held, so is for practitioners to make final determinations. [ICO guidance on single burdensome requests](#) may assist any force considering such an approach.

Where neither s12 nor s14 are being considered, then what is suitable for disclosure will depend on exactly what you hold. We recommend that forces review all DPIA's captured and, in consultation with your force experts, determine which once are suitable for release and which will present harm.

For DPIA's local to your force, it is highly probable that at least some will be identified as harmful, particularly those that reveal information about tools/tactics for CT, SOC, covert policing or other sensitive tactics or operations; please refer to the relevant internal teams for guidance on this – they are best placed to advise you based on the specifics of what the DPIA applies to. From a national perspective, very generic titles such as those which state tactics already known to be used by police such as polygraph testing, CHIS, etc can be given. At the other end of the scale, details of individual products which would otherwise attract an NCND if asked about under FOI such as Cellebrite or Longarm must be removed from your disclosure.

To help support you with making the above determinations, in addition to your consultation with the relevant teams, we ask that you refer to previous CRU guidance, especially on specific products/technologies, as this will guide you on current topics/products nationally considered suitable/not suitable for release. If, after completing thorough local assessment and a full review of all past CRU advice you are still unable to determine whether a DPIA

naming a specific product is suitable for release, then you can recontact us with the name of that product and we will aim to assist further via consultation with policing leads. However, please may we ask that you exhaust ALL avenues to determine harm in-force first? Whilst we can consult with leads on a limited basis, i.e. for products which simply cannot be deduced, we cannot consult on entire lists of unchecked multiple products from every force. We are only able to assist on the very few software products which you cannot apply previous advice and/or internal views to, to determine harm – so we ask that you do not send full lists of products for guidance.

There may also be national DPIA's held. In respect of these we recommend that in the first instance, each one is checked to see if information about it is in the public domain or not. For example, we understand some forces hold DPIA's for Op Innerste – this is in the PD and thus I'd see no reason to consult with the NPCC or Home Office, so we don't need to know about those DPIA's.

However, others may relate to subject matter which is not already publicly avowed and as such these will need to be consulted on with the relevant national body. For any of these identified as part of your checks, i.e. you identify any subject matter of a DPIA which is not referenced publicly already, then please can you send us a list of those titles alongside the national body (NPCC/Home Office/College) that they relate to and we will liaise with them to ensure they are content for you to release the titles as part of this FOI.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Form of words:

XXX Police neither confirms nor denies that it holds any other information relevant to this request by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 24(2) - National Security

Section 31(3) - Law Enforcement

Sections 24 and 31 are prejudice based qualified exemptions, both evidence of harm and public interest to be carried out.

Evidence of Harm:

Confirmation or denial that any other information is held would identify local level activity regarding data, its management and any relevant assessments that protect this data. In turn this risks identifying the areas that XXX Police may or may not be applying Data Protection Impact Assessments. This would reveal information which could be used to build a picture as to where national and local investigations and operations, along with their processes and systems, are being undertaken, and perhaps more pertinently where they are not. This mapping effect, created by forces either confirming information is held and citing a substantive exemption or, conversely, stating 'no information held', would undermine the effective delivery of operational law enforcement by revealing the intelligence picture of the force in respect of Data Protection and how it is managed as well as compromising potentially ongoing investigations, some of which may be covert.

Disclosure of information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) is considered a release to the world at large and not a private transaction. Whilst not questioning an applicant's motives in this case, by making a public disclosure under FOI, it must be considered that as well as members of the public, criminals, including terrorists will be able to access the data released. It is widely known that organised criminal gangs and those involved in terrorist related activity monitor FOI disclosures closely for any information they can use to further their criminal activity.

The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It should be recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. The UK faces a sustained threat from violent terrorists and extremists. Since 2006, the UK Government have published the threat level, based upon current intelligence that threat level to the UK currently is 'substantial, meaning an attack is likely.

<https://www.mi5.gov.uk/threat-levels>

Any information identifying the focus of policing activity and how they protect and manage data could be used to the advantage of criminal organisations, serious and organised crime groups and terrorists to undermine the operational integrity of policing will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on, not only law enforcement at a local level, but policing and operations at a national level, the impact of which risks the national security of the UK.

Public Interest Considerations

Section 24 (2) National Security

Factors favouring complying with Section 1(1)(a)

Any information that would increase public knowledge in showing how resources are allocated in response to events would favour confirming whether anything else was held or not. This would also support the fundamental purpose of the Freedom of Information Act, which is to be more open and transparent in the way in which the police perform, making them more accountable for their actions. Releasing any details regarding XXX Police's current Data Protection Impact Assessments would provide reassurance to the public that the police are appropriately resourced in this area and would be in a position to respond to any National Security threats or data breach incidents, along with protecting data of every individual with their force area. Any information which would allow for more accurate public debate would be a positive factor for disclosure.

Factors against complying with Section 1(1)(a)

Whilst there is a public interest in providing reassurance that the police are appropriately and effectively dealing with threats posed by terrorist organisations, there is a strong public interest in safeguarding national security and the welfare and safety of the general public, including all forms of personal data. Any disclosure (including confirming or denying information is held) has the potential to undermine ongoing and future operations to protect the Security of the United Kingdom, e.g. counter terrorism activity, both nationally and locally. The risk of significant harm or even death to the community at large would be increased.

The cumulative effect of terrorists gathering information from various sources would build a picture of potential vulnerabilities at a local level. The more information disclosed over time will provide a more detailed account of the investigative focus of not only a force area but also the country as a whole. Any incident which results from such a disclosure would by default affect National Security.

Section 31(3) Law Enforcement

Factors favouring complying with Section 1(1)(a)

To confirm or deny that any other information is held would make members of the public more aware of the threats and the forces ability to deal with them. Improved public awareness may lead to more intelligence being submitted to police about possible further instances regarding personal data and any acts of criminality or perceived terrorism as members of the public will be more observant to suspicious activity which in turn may result in a reduction of crime.

Factors against complying with Section 1(1)(a)


To confirm or deny that any other information is held could compromise law enforcement tactics which would hinder the Police force's ability to prevent and detect crimes. Whilst such information on its own may be perceived as not harmful, any further information that may be already in the public domain or any that may be asked for in the future could be detrimental to forces and can contribute to the mosaic effect. The 'mosaic' effect is attune to the building up of a jigsaw, from public disclosures and other information, gradually filling in the pieces to form a complete picture. For criminals, including serious and organised crime groups and terrorists to gain easy access to such information, including data for intelligence purposes, along with everyone's personal data would not only undermine the police's primary function of law enforcement but also place the public at significant risk of harm.

Balancing Test

XXX Police is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. The security and maintenance of investigations are of paramount importance and the XXX Police will not divulge whether any other information is or is not held. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing and providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat from criminals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of police investigations.

It is therefore our opinion that for these issues the balancing test for confirming or not that information is held, is not made out.

Kind regards



National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council



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[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] >
Sent: 10 September 2025 15:28
Subject: CRU ref: 25/5158/I - Copies of multiple policies - Including Advice

[REDACTED]

OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. Advice is at the end of this message.

Our reference: 25/5158/I
Referred by: All forces

Applicant's request:

The current versions of your internal policies and/or procedures relating to:

Violence Against Women and Girls (VAWG)
Child Sexual Abuse (CSA)
Child Sexual Exploitation (CSE)
Safeguarding of vulnerable adults and children
Victim communication, trauma-informed approaches, and victim engagement

Any internal guidance issued to officers regarding:
Victim withdrawal of support and No Further Action outcomes
The Victim's Right to Review (VRR) process
Supporting survivors with complex trauma, neurodivergence, or language barriers

If applicable, your local implementation strategy or action plan relating to:
The NPCC VAWG strategic framework
Operation Soteria Bluestone
Public confidence or trust-building plans with survivors of sexual violence

If any of these documents are not available, please confirm whether such policies or guidance exist.

CRU Advice:

As with any request, the first consideration should be cost. If to locate and retrieve the requested information would exceed the cost limits of the act, then s12 should be used. When issuing your refusal notice we recommend you notify the applicant how best to refine their request, if feasible to do so.

If s12 is not relevant, then it is possible s14 may be a consideration for some. It will obviously depend upon how much information is retrieved and the extent to which that will require review and redaction to prepare it for release, however if forces are of the view that to review and redact the information to prepare it for release would impose an excessive burden to the force, then s14 can be considered.

For forces that are considering this approach, [ICO guidance on single burdensome requests](#) is provided for you to refer to. If following review of that guidance you require further specific assistance from us on the use of s14, then please refer to us with details and we will aim to assist.

If neither s12 nor s14 apply, then the following is relevant:

For any information already in the public domain from an official source, s21 can be cited. For anything else held, thorough local assessment will be required in consultation with the relevant business area for any s31(1)(a)(b) and s40(2) considerations.

[REDACTED]

If nothing is identified as originating from or related to a s23 body or a national body, then we are happy for you to proceed with your own s31 and s40 assessment.

Kind regards

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council

[REDACTED]



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From: NPCC CRU Mailbox [REDACTED]
Sent: 15 September 2025 14:41
Subject: CRU ref: 25/5170/E - External traditional forensics - Including Advice

Categories: [REDACTED]

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. Advice is at the end of this message.

Our reference: 25/5170/E

Referred by: All forces

Applicant's request:

Please provide the total amount in £ (excluding VAT) that your force has spent on external physical (traditional) forensic science services. Do not include any spend on digital forensics. I request that this is broken down into categories based on the Lot Code and description specified in the contract(s) awarded to your private forensic science provider suppliers.

For each category, please include:

1. The Lot Code (as per the contract)
2. The Lot description (e.g., DNA Crime Stains)
3. The total spend (£, ex VAT)
4. The supplier name

For example:

Lot X | DNA Crime Stains | £1,000,000 | Eurofins Forensic Services

Lot Y | Toxicology | £500,000 | Cellmark Forensic Services

CRU Advice:

As with any request, cost should be the first consideration. If to locate and retrieve all the requested information would exceed the cost limits of the act, then s12 is recommended to be used. When issuing your refusal notice we recommend you notify the applicant how best to refine their request, if feasible to do so. If cost is not a factor, then the following advice applies:

Firstly, as the request asks only for "traditional" forensics only and no digital forensic providers (which *are* exempt), we see no immediate risk from a law enforcement perspective in providing supplier names.

In terms of providing the lot number and description, then we can again see no immediate risks provided the detail you propose to release does not disclose any otherwise non-avowed or sensitive forensic techniques which are undertaken. Based on the few forces who have provided us with the information they hold, I have not yet seen anything of such a nature which would require redaction under s31(1)(a)(b), however we'd still advise you to check this before issuing your response.

With no obvious s31 considerations, the only other area of concern are any procurement sensitivities falling under s43, 'commercial interests', Ultimately, it will be for contracts team to identify any specific harm associated with

disclosure, for example if a disclosure would reveal low level commercially sensitive data such as unit prices, or other low level or unique information that could be deemed commercially sensitive to the supplier then s43 would be engaged and could apply depending on the strength of your public interest arguments. Equally, if there is any risk to the commercial interests of the public authority (say, a contract is currently up for tender and revealing information which constitutes low level costings would harm that, then again, s43 could be considered. However, as you are likely aware, there is high threshold required to balance the public interest in favour of non-disclosure for s43– ICO guidance can be found [here](#) to assist you with that further if required. On that basis, and in our view, unless your procurement/contracts team identify anything specific to your force, the spends can be provided.

Kind regards



National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council



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[REDACTED]

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox <[REDACTED]>
Sent: 18 September 2025 13:25
Subject: CRU ref: 25/5194/M - DVI - Including Advice

Categories: [REDACTED]

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. Advice is at the end of this message.

Our reference: 25/5194/M

Referred by: National

Applicant's request:

I would like to request the following information relating to Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) provision within your force.

- Where possible, please provide total counts disaggregated by gender where this information is recorded. I generally expect yes/no responses, but any additional context would be gratefully appreciated.
- 1. Staffing and Deployment
 - * The number of officers/staff currently trained in DVI within your force (please indicate gender if recorded).
 - * The number of DVI-trained officers/staff deployed in the last five years, and the categories of incidents they were deployed to (please group as: terrorism, transport incidents, industrial accidents, and natural disasters) - total numbers only, to preserve anonymity.
 - * Which department or unit within the force is responsible for DVI planning and deployment.
 - * The typical length of service an officer/staff member remains active on the DVI roster once trained (e.g., average number of years, or whether there is a set term).
 - * Whether your force applies any suitability checks or criteria prior to deployment of DVI-trained officers (e.g., health, psychological readiness, or operational availability).

CRU Advice:

Following consultation with the policing lead, we have been advised that this request is likely to exceed the cost limits of the act. Question 2 specifically asks for information which the national leads feel will not be held in a readily retrievable format. To locate and retrieve all this information, a manual check of every incident will be required to establish if DVI trained officers have been deployed and further, how many. Given the scope of incidents to which a DVI trained officer may be deployed and the timeframe of the request, it is felt that this manual review will exceed 18 hours of work and thus s12 will be applicable. As all questions in the request are on materially similar subject matter, where s12 applies to one question it can be applied to the request as a whole.

At this stage we therefore advise s12 is relevant. In providing this response, we recommend you offer advice and assistance where you see fit.

If s12 is not relevant to your force, please provide us with the information you hold and any comments from your force teams on suitability for disclosure and we will then refer back to the policing lead for further views. In this instance, and given further consultation will be required, we recommend you PIT extend the request where possible. A form of words is below if it assists.

PIT wording:

'The FOI Act obliges a public authority to respond to requests promptly and in any case no later than 20 working days after receiving your request. The first consideration is whether we can comply with s1(1)(a) of the Act, which is our duty to confirm whether or not the information requested is held, secondly we must comply with s1(1)(b), which is the provision of such information. However, when a qualified exemption applies either to the confirmation, or denial or to the information itself, and the public interest test is engaged, section 17(2) of the Act allows the time for responding to be extended to longer than 20 working days, if the balance of such public interest is yet to be determined.

In this case we have not yet reached a decision on where the balance of the public interest lies in respect of either of the above obligations. We estimate that it will take an additional [xx] days to take a decision on where this balance lies. Therefore, we plan to let you have a response by [date]. If it appears that it will take longer than this to reach a conclusion, you will be kept informed.

The specific exemption(s) which apply in relation to your request is/are: [include a brief explanation of why it/they apply unless it is not apparent or unless you are not required to do so by virtue of s17(4)].

Insert usual complaint information.'

Kind regards



National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council



Q1 - When we consulted with policing leads in 2021, it was agreed that the total number of DVI trained officers per force was not suitable for release and should be withheld to protect tactical capability. Having re-checked with UKDVI, this remains the case. This question therefore requires exemption by virtue of s31(1)(a)(b). A form of words can be found at the end of this advice.

Q2 – The applicant asks for the number of DVI trained officers deployed over a 5-year period, further they request a breakdown of these numbers by incident type.

I think it is likely there would be public acknowledgment and/or media coverage for any incident of the scale for which DVI trained officers were required to attend, so the risk in providing a generic list of incident categories attended by DCI officers in general over a 5-year period (with no dates, total number of incidents or further information about them) would not seem particularly harmful.

However, in terms of providing the number of officers deployed,

Further providing this broken down by incident type:

In terms of providing the total number of DVI trained officers who have attended each category (as a total over 5 years for each), although harm seems somewhat mitigated because it does not ask about individual deployments, considering the approach taken to Q1 and the fact disclosed figures would represent the level of DVI officer deployment at *different types of incident* (which could be argued to reveal operational capability) do you believe exemptions should be applied to officer numbers deployed to each incident category? If you do, we would appreciate your reasoning for this and rationale in as much detail as possible so we can formulate accurate advice to all forces. If you do not feel it is harmful to disclose these figures against the list of incidents, perhaps because it represents past deployments, or the number of officers deployed to an incident is dynamic and case by case not formulaic, then we would be grateful for that confirmation also.

Q3 – We see no specific harm in answering this question.

Q4 – The applicant asks for the “typical” length of service of a DVI officer. Such information is not likely to be held as recorded information and so a NIH response should be provided.

Q5 – Overall we cannot see harm in providing a response, however we recommend forces locally assess what is held to ensure no operational sensitivities are captured.

Wording - [2021/24282 - DVI | Gwent Police, foi-2021-563 disaster-victim-identification.pdf](#), [Disaster Victim Identification - 566/2021 | Dyfed-Powys Police](#),

S31 Harm and PIT wording

Evidence of Harm:

The police service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. The release of any operational capability in terms of numbers of trained DVI personnel could undermine that position. Whilst not questioning the motives of any one applicant that may request this information, it must be appreciated that a release under FOI is a disclosure to the world.

DVI is a specialism held by many police forces across the country, in numbers sufficient that in the event of a disaster on the largest scale that sufficient DVI trained personnel can respond.

However, disclosure of the exact number of DVI trained personnel currently in the force would undermine operational capability, providing those that would seek to commit criminal acts, information as to the current police DVI resources

Kind regards



National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council





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From: NPCC CRU Mailbox [REDACTED] >
Sent: 15 September 2025 09:31
Subject: CRU ref: 25/5220/X - Costs and arrests at PA protests - Including Advice

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU on . Advice is at the end of this message.

Our reference: 25/5220/X
Referred by: Bedfordshire Police

Applicant's request:

1. Since July 5th 2025 until the date that this request is received, how much has been spent on policing protests directly linked to Palestine Action?
2. Since July 5th 2025 until the date that this request is received, how many cumulative days have people arrested for supporting Palestine Action (under Terrorism Act 2000) spent in custody suites?
3. Since July 5th 2025 until the date that this request is received, how many people arrested for supporting Palestine Action (under Terrorism Act 2000) have been:
 - Released without bail
 - Released with bail
 - Charged
 - Remanded in custody

CRU Advice:

As with any request the first consideration should be cost. If to locate and retrieve all the requested information would exceed the cost limits of the act, s12 is recommended to be used. When issuing your refusal notice we recommend you notify the applicant how best to refine the request, if feasible to do so. If cost is not relevant, the following advice is provided:

Q1 – If you have assigned a specific cost code to policing of PA protests, then you may be able to locate and retrieve relevant information for this question. Where so, we see no immediate harm in forces confirming a total figure. If no specific figure is held, for example policing the protests was within normal operational duties i.e. no direct, separate costs, then we'd see no harm in stating NIH with that explanation if you believe it is required for clarity.

Q2 & Q3 – Subject to your local assessment for any s40(2), and possibly s31(1) sensitivities if ongoing investigations could be undermined through disclosure, then figures can be considered for release.

Kind regards

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]



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[REDACTED]

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox [REDACTED] >
Sent: 22 September 2025 12:57
Subject: CRU reference - 25/5263/I OR 25/5253/G - Modern Slavery reports and outcomes - Including Advice

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. Advice is at the end of this message. Please note, this is 1 request which was incorrectly logged with 2 different reference numbers in the CRU– some forces will have one while others will have the other. This was an administrative error at our end. Please check both our references against your records.

Our reference: 25/5263/I OR 25/5253/G
Referred by: All forces

Applicant's request:

1. Please provide the number of cases of modern slavery and human trafficking reported to the force for each calendar year between January 1st 2019 and December 31st 2024.
2. Please disaggregate data according to the following information:

The crime outcome of the offences (for example, this includes but is not limited to outcomes such as 'cautioned', 'charged/summonsed', evidential difficulties (victim does not support investigation), no suspect identified, 'Not in public interest (police)', Not in public interest (CPS)' and any other outcomes recorded),

3. The age of victims recorded, either adult (18 years or older) or child (17 years old or younger).

For the purposes of this request, 'victim' is a person who has reported having been a victim of this crime.

CRU Advice:

As with any request the first consideration should be cost. If to locate and retrieve all the requested information would exceed the cost limits of the act then s12 is recommended to be used. When issuing your refusal notice we recommend you notify the applicant how best to refine their request, if feasible to do so. If cost is not a factor then the following advice applies.

For any information already in the public domain from an official source, s21 can be cited. For any other information disclosure can be considered subject to your own local assessment to ensure no individuals could be identified or ongoing investigations undermined.

[REDACTED]

We do not need to see your draft response.

Kind regards



National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council



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[REDACTED]

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox [REDACTED] >
Sent: 29 September 2025 12:05
Subject: CRU reference - 25/5327/H - PAG Guidance - Including advice
Attachments: CRU reference Numbers - 25/5054/B, 25/5056/D, 25/5065/E, 25/5101/R - Guidance for Palestine Action - Including Advice

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. We have assumed the request has gone to all forces. You do not need to notify us that you have had this request.

Our reference: 25/5327/H
Referred by: All Forces

Applicant's request:

I would like to request all documents and information related to any guidance, training and relevant supporting documents provided to or created by your police force following 5 July 2025, as well as all internal guidance or training delivered by your force as it relates to:

- The policing of the protests in support of Palestine Action or against the proscription of this body, and;
- Online or offline support of the body.

CRU Advice:

Recent advice was circulated regarding guidance regarding PAG proscription - CRU ref: 5056/D (attached). This request may not capture everything captured and commented on in 5056/D, but that advice will provide you with our advice on local assessment as well as the position on any national documents you identify as captured here.

If you require anything further, please refer to the CRU.

Kind regards

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox [REDACTED] >
Sent: 02 September 2025 14:37
Subject: CRU reference: 01/CRF/25/005224/B - National Centurion Data Request

Good afternoon,

We are aware that the below FOI request has been received by forces:

Sent from: [REDACTED]
Log No. 01/CRF/25/005224/B

The Applicant name is included in the acknowledgement email as a reference for forces only, any future correspondence will only quote the CRU reference number. Please do not duplicate the applicant name in any future correspondence and use only the CRU reference number

Request:

1. What is your current policy regarding the publication of details for upcoming police misconduct hearings?
 - Specifically, when are these details made available on your website?
 - How long are they retained and publicly accessible prior to the hearing?
2. Following the conclusion of a misconduct hearing:
 - When is the outcome published on your website?
 - How long is the outcome retained in a publicly accessible format?
 - What are the reasons and criteria for withdrawing this information from public view?
 - At what point is the information removed from a format that is searchable by the public?

Report to be run by FIS for Q3

3. For each of the following reporting years: 2020–2021, 2021–2022, 2022–2023, 2023–2024, 2024–2025
 - Please provide the number of misconduct outcomes in which the name of the police officer involved was published [REDACTED]
 - and the number of misconduct hearings where misconduct was found.

We have notified [Force Information Systems](#) (FIS) of the request and they will now prepare a report to extract the data from Centurion, for use by all force Professional Standard Departments. Please make your PSD aware of the request in line with your usual processes, and that a report will be available on the member's area of FIS website. This will be 10 days from us notifying FIS today. FIS will notify your PSD independently when this is ready.

Please note we do not require acknowledgement from forces that they have received this request, and **CRU advice is not currently being prepared.**

Should you require CRU advice for this please refer in the usual way.

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]
Management Assistant
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs' Council

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox <[REDACTED]>
Sent: 02 September 2025 14:55
Subject: CRU reference: 01/CRF/25/005225/C - National Centurion Data Request

Good afternoon,

We are aware that the below FOI request has been received by forces:

Sent from: [REDACTED]
Log No. 01/CRF/25/005225/C

The Applicant name is included in the acknowledgement email as a reference for forces only, any future correspondence will only quote the CRU reference number. Please do not duplicate the applicant name in any future correspondence and use only the CRU reference number

Request:

- A list of all police officers who are currently suspended on full pay, including their rank, the reason for their suspension, and the number of days they have been suspended.

We have notified [Force Information Systems](#) (FIS) of the request and they will now prepare a report to extract the data from Centurion, for use by all force Professional Standard Departments. Please make your PSD aware of the request in line with your usual processes, and that a report will be available on the member's area of FIS website. This will be 10 days from us notifying FIS today. FIS will notify your PSD independently when this is ready.

Please note we [do not require acknowledgement from forces](#) that they have received this request, and [CRU advice is not currently being prepared](#).

Should you require CRU advice for this please refer in the usual way.

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]
Management Assistant
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs' Council

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox <[REDACTED]>
Sent: 11 September 2025 08:13
Subject: CRU reference: 01/CRF/25/005248/J - AI Systems - Request logged - Advice to Follow

Categories: [REDACTED]

Dear All,

The below request logged in the CRU on Monday.

Please note we do not require confirmation that it has been received by your force.

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]
Management Assistant
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs' Council

[REDACTED]



From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)
Sent: Monday, September 8, 2025 9:48 AM
To: [Freedom of Information](#)
Received: Monday, September 8, 2025 9:48 AM
Subject: CRU 01/CRF/25/005248/J - AI Systems - Your ref 17582/25

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request has now been logged in the CRU. Advice will follow in due course.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005248/J
Referred by: Northamptonshire Police, Sussex Police
Sent from: [REDACTED]

The Applicant name is included in the acknowledgement email as a reference for forces only, any future correspondence will only quote the CRU reference number. Please do not duplicate the applicant name in any future correspondence and use only the CRU reference number

Applicant's request:

I am writing to request information under freedom of information legislation, regarding your organisation's use of artificial intelligence (AI) technology/technologies.

I would be grateful if you could provide the following detail:

1) AI Systems in use

A list of tools, platforms or systems currently deployed or being piloted/trialled.

The purpose and function of each of the above.

The departments or services where these are operational.

2) Procurement and development

Details of any contracts, tenders or partnerships with external providers for AI solutions.

Total expenditure on AI related technologies over the past three financial years, broken down by year.

3) Governance and Ethical Oversight

Copies of, or information relating to, any internal policies, frameworks or guidance documents relating to the use of AI.

Any ethical review processes or risk assessments conducted prior to deployment.

Details of any group responsible for the oversight of AI use within your organisation.

4) Impact on Workforce

Any assessments, reports or internal communications regarding the impact of AI on staffing levels, job roles or workforce planning (including recruitment, redundancy).

Information on any roles that have been automated, restructured or made redundant due to AI implementation.

Details of any training, redeployment or upskilling initiatives offered to staff in response to the adoption of AI.

Any consultations with trade unions or staff representatives regarding AI-related changes.

5) Performance and Evaluation

Evaluations, audits or performance reviews of AI systems, as referenced in section 1.

Evidence of how AI systems have affected service delivery, decision-making or operational efficiency.

6) Data protection and privacy

Types of data used to train or operate AI systems, including whether this data is synthetic or not.

Measures in place to ensure compliance with data protection legislation, including the DPA 2018 and UK GDPR.

Procedures for handling bias, transparency and accountability in AI decision-making.

If any of the above information is already publicly accessible, please provide details as to where this information can be accessed and if any clarification is required, please contact me ASAP.

Thank you in advance for your support with this request - I look forward to your response.

Kind regards,

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(Pronoun: she/her why have I put this?)

NPFDU FOI Referral Officer

National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit | National Police Chiefs Council

, NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

* [Redacted]

' Via MS Teams

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox [REDACTED]
Sent: 17 September 2025 07:40
Subject: CRU reference: 01/CRF/25/005266/L - Mobile phone data extraction - Request logged - Advice to Follow

Dear All,

The below FOI request has now been logged in the CRU and will be treated as a national request. Advice will be sent to all forces in due course.

Please note we do not require confirmation that it has been received by your force.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005266/L
Referred by: Metropolitan Police Service, Northumbria Police, Surrey Police, Warwickshire Police
Sent from: [REDACTED]

The Applicant name is included in the acknowledgement email as a reference for forces only, any future correspondence will only quote the CRU reference number. Please do not duplicate the applicant name in any future correspondence and use only the CRU reference number

Applicant's request:

I am writing to ask that you provide me with the following information on your use of mobile phone data extraction:

1. Does your police force currently carry out mobile phone data extraction in low level crime cases using self-service / downloading kiosks? Please provide your definition of low-level crime.
2. Does your police force currently carry out mobile phone data extraction in serious crimes using self-service / downloading kiosks?
3. If your police force is not currently using mobile phone extraction kiosks, have you trialled this in the past/do you have plans to in the future?
4. Does your police force currently use Hubs to carry out mobile phone data extraction in (a) low-level crimes? (b) serious crimes?
5. Do you centrally record mobile phone data extracted from kiosks?
6. If you have a mobile phone extraction kiosk, please provide the name of the company(ies) which currently provide(s) the hardware / software / to whom you pay a license for the relevant tools. If contracts for these tools exist, please also provide the beginning and end dates of these.
7. Does your police force use analytics software to process, analyse or evaluate data extracted from mobile phones? If so, please provide the name of the software or provider.
8. How many officers currently carry mobile phone examination kits on patrol and/or in vehicles and/or for other operational use in (a) low level crimes? (b) serious crimes?
9. Please confirm whether or not a review has been conducted into the use of self-service kiosks.
10. Please provide copies of the current relevant force level and/or national level guidance for the use of downloading kiosks.
11. Please provide copies of the current relevant force level and/or national level policy for the use of downloading kiosks.

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]
Management Assistant
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs' Council
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox <[REDACTED]>
Sent: 10 September 2025 15:12
Subject: CRU reference: 01/CRF/25/005269/O - Missing Children - Request logged - Advice to Follow

Categories: [REDACTED]

Dear All,

The below FOI request has now been logged in the CRU and will be treated as a national request. Advice will be sent to all forces in due course.

Please note we do not require confirmation that it has been received by your force.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005269/O
Referred by: Northumbria Police
Sent from: [REDACTED]

The Applicant name is included in the acknowledgement email as a reference for forces only, any future correspondence will only quote the CRU reference number. Please do not duplicate the applicant name in any future correspondence and use only the CRU reference number

Applicant's request:

Please provide the following information for the period 1 January 2024 - 31 December 2024.

1. How many individual children (those aged 0 - 17) were reported missing in your policing area?
2. How many missing incidents were reported in relation to those missing children (those aged 0 - 17)?
3. How many of those missing incidents had a:
 - a. Sexual exploitation marker
 - b. Mental health marker
 - c. Criminal exploitation marker
 - d. Trafficking marker
4. In how many incidents was there evidence of harm having occurred?
5. In how many of those incidents in question 4 was the harm:
 - a. Physical
 - b. Sexual
 - c. Self-harm
 - d. Suicide
 - e. Emotional / psychological
6. If you routinely record another type of risk marker / type of harm that is not listed here, please also include that information and the number of incidents in which it was recorded.

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]
Management Assistant
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs' Council
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox <[REDACTED]>
Sent: 16 September 2025 12:19
Subject: CRU reference: 01/CRF/25/005287/Q - AI-enabled policing platforms - Request logged - Advice to Follow

Categories: [REDACTED]

Dear All,

The below FOI request has now been logged in the CRU and will be treated as a national request. Advice will be sent to all forces in due course.

Please note we do not require confirmation that it has been received by your force.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005287/Q
Referred by: PSNI (FOI/15760)
Sent from: [REDACTED]

The Applicant name is included in the acknowledgement email as a reference for forces only, any future correspondence will only quote the CRU reference number. Please do not duplicate the applicant name in any future correspondence and use only the CRU reference number

Applicant's request:

I am writing to request information under the FOIA which relates to AI-enabled policing projects (including but not limited to machine learning, predictive analytics, or natural language processing) that have been in trial, development, or deployment at any point in 2025.

- 1) Copies of any portfolio, project listing, reports, presentations, or internal summaries relating to AI-enabled projects (including but not limited to machine learning, predictive analytics, natural language processing, or facial recognition technologies) that are currently in development, trial, or operation within this police force, or its associated ROCU.
- 2) Where available, details of:
 - a) The name or description of each project
 - b) The units or departments involved
 - c) External collaborators (contractors, researchers, consultants, etc.)
 - d) The intended purpose or application of the technology
 - e) The status (e.g. research, pilot, deployment, discontinued)
 - f) Any funding source (Home Office, NPCC, or other)

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]
Management Assistant
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs' Council
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox [REDACTED]
Sent: 23 September 2025 15:10
Subject: CRU reference: 01/CRF/25/005318/G - Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) - Request logged - Advice to Follow

Categories: New Request

Dear All,

The below FOI request has now been logged in the CRU and will be treated as a national request. Advice will be sent to all forces in due course.

Please note we do not require confirmation that it has been received by your force.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005318/G
Referred by: South Yorkshire Police, Wiltshire Constabulary
Sent from: [REDACTED]

The Applicant name is included in the acknowledgement email as a reference for forces only, any future correspondence will only quote the CRU reference number. Please do not duplicate the applicant name in any future correspondence and use only the CRU reference number.

Applicant's request:

Please provide me with the following information relating to payments made to Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS).

1. For the financial years 21/22, 22/23, 23/24, 24/25 and 25/26 (so far) please a value for how much the police force has spent on CHIS, providing a breakdown for each FY
2. For the financial years 21/22, 22/23, 23/24, 24/25 and 25/26 (so far) please state how many CHIS authorisations were granted to the police force, providing a breakdown for each FY
3. For the financial years 21/22, 22/23, 23/24, 24/25 and 25/26 (so far) please state how much the police force has spent on CHIS related to Palestine protest groups, providing a breakdown for each FY

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]
Management Assistant
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs' Council



[REDACTED]

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox <[REDACTED]>
Sent: 26 September 2025 11:15
Subject: CRU reference: 01/CRF/25/005327/H - Guidance, training and relevant supporting documents relating to Palestine Action - Request logged - Advice to Follow

Dear All,

The below FOI request has now been logged in the CRU and will be treated as a national request. Advice will be sent to all forces in due course.

Please note we do not require confirmation that it has been received by your force.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005327/H
Referred by: Northamptonshire Police (19017/25), Nottinghamshire Police (014490), South Yorkshire Police (FOI2025/02282)
Sent from: [REDACTED]

The Applicant name is included in the acknowledgement email as a reference for forces only, any future correspondence will only quote the CRU reference number. Please do not duplicate the applicant name in any future correspondence and use only the CRU reference number

Applicant's request:

I would like to request all documents and information related to any guidance, training and relevant supporting documents provided to or created by your police force following 5 July 2025, as well as all internal guidance or training delivered by your force as it relates to:

- The policing of the protests in support of Palestine Action or against the proscription of this body, and;
- Online or offline support of the body.

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]
Management Assistant
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs' Council

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox [REDACTED]
Sent: 26 September 2025 11:15
Subject: CRU reference: 01/CRF/25/005327/H - Guidance, training and relevant supporting documents relating to Palestine Action - Request logged - Advice to Follow

Dear All,

The below FOI request has now been logged in the CRU and will be treated as a national request. Advice will be sent to all forces in due course.

Please note we do not require confirmation that it has been received by your force.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005327/H
Referred by: Northamptonshire Police (19017/25), Nottinghamshire Police (014490), South Yorkshire Police (FOI2025/02282)
Sent from: [REDACTED]

The Applicant name is included in the acknowledgement email as a reference for forces only, any future correspondence will only quote the CRU reference number. Please do not duplicate the applicant name in any future correspondence and use only the CRU reference number

Applicant's request:

I would like to request all documents and information related to any guidance, training and relevant supporting documents provided to or created by your police force following 5 July 2025, as well as all internal guidance or training delivered by your force as it relates to:

- The policing of the protests in support of Palestine Action or against the proscription of this body, and;
- Online or offline support of the body.

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]
Management Assistant
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs' Council

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox <[REDACTED]>
Sent: 04 September 2025 12:03
Subject: FW: CRU 01/CRF/25/005163/F - Polygraph Testing - Advice Included
Attachments: Advice for Polygraph FOI - 560/23, 700/23 and 730/23 - OS

Good afternoon all,

Recirculating the below in case this was not originally received.

Kind regards



National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council



From: NPCC CRU Mailbox
Sent: 02 September 2025 07:37
Subject: CRU 01/CRF/25/005163/F - Polygraph Testing - Advice Included

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. Advice is at the end of this message.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005163/F
Referred by: Staffordshire Police

Applicant's request:

I am conducting research into the use of polygraph testing by UK police forces, particularly in the management and monitoring of sex offenders, and wish to better understand the scope, outcomes, and governance of such practices.

Please treat this as a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

Request

Please provide the following information:

1. Implementation timeline

- a. The month and year in which your force first began using polygraph tests in relation to sex offenders.
- b. Whether usage has expanded since initial implementation, and if so, how and when.

2. Volume of testing

- a. Annual totals of polygraph tests conducted since implementation.
- b. Cumulative total number of tests administered to date.

3. Types of subjects

- a. The number of convicted sex offenders (e.g., under licence, probation, or other) tested each year, versus suspects not yet convicted.
- b. Annual breakdowns where possible.

4. Outcomes of testing

- a. The number of tests leading to further disclosures (e.g., admissions of reoffending, breach of licence conditions, or other risk-related information).
- b. The number of tests resulting in actual action (e.g., changes to licence conditions, recall to custody, initiation of investigations).
- c. Any data on the percentage of tests resulting in significant disclosures or actions.

5. Purpose and procedure

- a. The stated purpose of polygraph testing within your force's sex offender management or investigative processes.
- b. Who conducts the tests (e.g., trained police officers, probation staff, or external examiners).
- c. Whether the tests are voluntary or mandatory, and under what circumstances.
- d. The training, standards, or qualifications required for individuals conducting polygraph examinations.
- e. The oversight mechanisms or quality assurance processes in place to ensure polygraph use is compliant and effective.

6. Legal and oversight considerations

- a. Whether polygraph results are admissible as evidence in court within your force's jurisdiction.
- b. Any legal or practical limitations your force has encountered regarding polygraph use (e.g., accuracy concerns, legal challenges, or statutory restrictions).
- c. Details of any internal or external evaluations, audits, or research into the effectiveness or reliability of polygraph testing in relation to sex offenders, including copies or references to such reports.

7. Policy and guidance

- a. Copies of any policies, procedures, training manuals, or internal guidance documents relating to the use of polygraph tests in relation to sex offenders.
- b. If full copies cannot be provided, the titles, authors, and dates of the documents.

CRU Advice:

Advice is provided on the assumption that all the requested information can be located and retrieved within the cost threshold. Where this is not the case, s12 is recommended to be used. When issuing your refusal notice we recommend you advise the applicant how best to refine their request, if feasible to do so.

Q1 - Each force will need to locally assess the information they hold relevant to these questions. However we see no harm in disclosing this figure if held.

b - As the applicant has only specified the time frame of 'When your force first began using polygraph tests in relation to sex offenders' this may go over cost depending on when your force started using polygraphs. If it does

not then we see no harm in a yes or no answer on the first part of the question but a partial NCND s23(5), s24(2), s30(3), s31(3) will be required for the second half of it in respect of any information held about the how and when uses of other polygraph functions that may capture CT related functions.

If your force does not use polygraph testing and have no polygraph trained officers or staff, you can disclose that you do not conduct polygraph testing of sex offenders and DA, however the partial NCND will still need to be applied for the CT related functions.

Q2 – We see no harm in these figures being disclosed as a whole

Q3 – Again we see no harm in these figures being disclosed as a whole.

Q4 -It is our understanding that forces do not routinely use Polygraph tests for investigative purposes. However, this is not to say that they haven't. Regardless, as the applicant has been broad in that the questions relating to "any further disclosures", Subject to local assessment, there is no immediate harm in providing statistical data requested, along with the partial NCND [REDACTED]

Forces that do not conduct Polygraph testing can state No Information held in respect of sex offenders and DA offenders, [REDACTED]

Q5(a)- This is simply an explanation of why polygraphs are used as the applicant has not been very specific

b-This can be disclosed but no ranks given

c- We see no harm in this being disclosed if held

d&e – This will need through local assessment and may be likely to require the partial NCND [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Q6 – Have your legal team areas discussed any harm that they see in these questions. We would advise practitioners to first seek out there comments. We envision that Q6(a) will be acceptable to be disclosed and Qb & Qc will need to have the partial NDND but this will need to be evaluated by your team.

Q7 – Please see attached advice 560/23

Please find below a form of words to assist.

Form of words to assist

Force Name can neither confirm nor deny whether it holds any other information that you requested as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 23(5) - Information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters

Section 24(2) – National Security

Section 30(3) – Criminal Investigations

Section 31(3) – Law Enforcement

HARM

The FOI Act is 'applicant blind'. This means that we cannot, and do not, ask about the motives of anyone who asks for information. In providing a response to one person, we are expressing a willingness to provide the same response to anyone, including those who might represent a threat to the UK.

It is public knowledge that not all Police forces conduct Polygraph Testing of post-conviction sex offenders, and this extends to the testing of Domestic Abuse (DA) offenders. It is also public knowledge that the 2014 National Policing stance sets out the evidential implications of using Polygraph within the investigation setting:

However, modern day policing is intelligence led and this is particularly pertinent with regard to law enforcement, and Counter Terrorism. The public expect police forces to use all powers and tactics available to them to prevent and detect crime or disorder and maintain public safety. As such, confirmation or denial is only possible when doing so would not reveal certain tactics and techniques, the extent to which they may be deployed, and whether information is held that has a bearing on matters of National Security.

The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. Since 2006, the UK Government has published the threat level based upon current intelligence, and that threat is currently judged as "SUBSTANTIAL", meaning that an attack on the UK is likely.

It is well established that police forces use tactics and technology to gain intelligence in order to counteract criminal behaviour, and it has been previously documented in the media that many terrorist incidents have been thwarted due to intelligence gained by these means.

To confirm or deny that any other information is held in relation to Polygraph testing in circumstances or scenarios beyond sex offender, or DA offender management at force level, would reveal whether the technique has utility beyond post-conviction sex offender, or DA offender testing within the wider Law Enforcement sphere. Notably, to confirm or deny whether any other information is held relevant to Polygraph testing in a Counter Terrorism setting, whether that is a post-conviction terrorist offender, or someone suspected of being so connected with such activities, would reveal whether such techniques are in use as an investigative, and more so, intelligence gathering tactic.

Confirmation or denial across the Police Service would infer that there are gaps within the intelligence picture nationally which, for certain criminal elements and extremists, may embolden them to focus efforts within areas that they deem to be "soft" targets. Any incident that results from such a disclosure would by default affect National Security.

Public Interest Test

Some of the exemptions in the FOI Act, referred to as 'qualified exemptions', are subject to a public interest test (PIT). This test is used to balance the public interest in disclosure against the public interest in favour of withholding the information, or the considerations for and against the requirement to say whether the information requested is held or not. We must carry out a PIT where we are considering using any of the qualified exemptions in response to a request for information.

The 'public interest' is not the same as what interests the public. In carrying out a PIT we consider the greater good or benefit to the community as a whole if the information is released or not. The 'right to know' must be balanced against the need to enable effective law enforcement and to serve the best interests of the public.

S24(2) - Considerations in favour of confirming or denying the information is held

The public are entitled to know how public funds are spent and confirm or deny the requested information is held would allow the public to see where money is being spent and know that forces are doing as much as possible to combat terrorism.

S24(2) - Considerations in favour of neither confirming or denying the information is held

To confirm or deny information is held would render security measures less effective. Any information shared between law enforcement partners (i.e. intelligence) has the potential to cover all aspects of criminal activity, be it threats to life, or intelligence relating to terrorist activity. Confirmation or denial could highlight to those intent on criminality, whether or not information has been shared. Confirming such would dramatically weaken the effectiveness of intelligence led policing. The public entrust the Police Service to make appropriate decisions with

regard to their safety and protection and the only way of reducing risk is to be cautious with any information, no matter how generic that is.

S30(3) - Considerations in favour of confirming or denying the information is held

There is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that **Force Name** is appropriately and effectively dealing with Counter Terrorism. Confirming or denying whether any other information is held would allow the public to make informed decisions about these matters.

S30(3) - Considerations in favour of neither confirming or denying the information is held

Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that **Force Name** is appropriately and effectively dealing with the threat of Terrorism, there is a strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of police investigations and operations and in maintaining confidence in the Police Service. Any ongoing or future investigations, or operations to protect the security and infrastructure of the UK would be compromised as terrorists could map the level of Counter-Terrorist activity and intelligence sharing across the country, providing them with the knowledge of individual force capability as well as valuable knowledge concerning the vulnerability of individual force areas.

S31(3) - Considerations in favour of confirming or denying the information is held

FORCE NAME has a responsibility to conduct its business in an open and transparent manner. Confirmation or denial of all circumstances related to the use of Polygraph testing would assure the public that the police is committed to combating crime and terrorism. It would also ensure the public that the activities of certain individuals are being monitored by law enforcement so that individuals are aware of the investigative techniques used in order to protect the public, thus leading to better public awareness.

S31(3) - Considerations in favour of neither confirming or denying the information is held

Disclosure of the information, if held, would mean releasing sensitive information into the public domain, which could compromise law enforcement tactics, which could in turn hinder the prevention and detection of crime. To disclose whether information is held in relation to Polygraph Testing, whether by the force itself, or through the provision of information from other Law Enforcement partners in relation to Counter Terrorism would:

- a) allow criminals and extremists to evade prosecution or detection if they believe such practices are not in use for the purpose of seeking intelligence, or;
- b) cause criminals and extremists to alter their behaviour if they become aware of the tactics and techniques the police might employ, and to what extent.

Therefore confirming or denying whether any other information is held could compromise the prevention and detection of crime, which includes Terrorism.

Balancing Test

As evidenced within the harm above, confirming or denying any other information is held relevant to this request would start to indicate levels of specific policing activity at force level, and more broadly from a national perspective in relation to Counter Terrorism matters.

The Police Service will not divulge information if to do so would place the safety of an individual at risk or undermine Law Enforcement. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations, and in this case providing assurance that **FORCE NAME** is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by criminal and terrorist activity (either at force level or through the provision of assistance to, or from partners) there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding law enforcement, which by extension includes National Security.

As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced about such matters, this will only ever be overridden in exceptional circumstances. Matters in relation to crime and terrorism are sensitive issues of intelligence value to those who would do harm, and therefore it is our opinion that for these issues the balancing test for confirming or denying whether any other information is held in relation to Polygraph tests and Counter Terrorism would not be in the public interest.

If you need any further advice please let us know.

Kind regards,

[Redacted signature]

[\(Pronoun: she/her why have I put this?\)](#)

NPFDU FOI Referral Officer

National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit | National Police Chiefs Council

, NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

* [Redacted contact information]

' Via MS Teams

Advanced notification of leave:

[Redacted content]

[REDACTED]

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox [REDACTED]
Sent: 10 September 2025 15:45
Subject: FW: CRU ref: 25/5158/I - Copies of multiple policies - Including Advice

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU
Good afternoon,

Further to the below, please can you ensure any replies are sent only to the generic CRU mailbox and NOT the personal email the original advice was sent from. This was an IT error.

Please only use the following email for this and any other replies:

[REDACTED]

Apologies for the confusion.

Kind regards

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council

[REDACTED]



From: [REDACTED]
Sent: 10 September 2025 15:28
Subject: CRU ref: 25/5158/I - Copies of multiple policies - Including Advice

OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. Advice is at the end of this message.

Our reference: 25/5158/I

Referred by: All forces

Applicant's request:

The current versions of your internal policies and/or procedures relating to:

Violence Against Women and Girls (VAWG)

Child Sexual Abuse (CSA)

Child Sexual Exploitation (CSE)

Safeguarding of vulnerable adults and children

Victim communication, trauma-informed approaches, and victim engagement

Any internal guidance issued to officers regarding:

Victim withdrawal of support and No Further Action outcomes

The Victim's Right to Review (VRR) process

Supporting survivors with complex trauma, neurodivergence, or language barriers

If applicable, your local implementation strategy or action plan relating to:

The NPCC VAWG strategic framework

Operation Soteria Bluestone

Public confidence or trust-building plans with survivors of sexual violence

If any of these documents are not available, please confirm whether such policies or guidance exist.

CRU Advice:

As with any request, the first consideration should be cost. If to locate and retrieve the requested information would exceed the cost limits of the act, then s12 should be used. When issuing your refusal notice we recommend you notify the applicant how best to refine their request, if feasible to do so.

If s12 is not relevant, then it is possible s14 may be a consideration for some. It will obviously depend upon how much information is retrieved and the extent to which that will require review and redaction to prepare it for release, however if forces are of the view that to review and redact the information to prepare it for release would impose an excessive burden to the force, then s14 can be considered.

For forces that are considering this approach, [ICO guidance on single burdensome requests](#) is provided for you to refer to. If following review of that guidance you require further specific assistance from us on the use of s14, then please refer to us with details and we will aim to assist.

If neither s12 nor s14 apply, then the following is relevant:

For any information already in the public domain from an official source, s21 can be cited. For anything else held, thorough local assessment will be required in consultation with the relevant business area for any s31(1)(a)(b) and s40(2) considerations.

Given the subject matter of some of the policies requested, CSE for example, there may also be some references to s23 bodies such as the NCA captured. [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] Equally in respect of internal guidance and/or implementation strategies, for anything identified as originating from a national body such as the NPCC, Home Office or College of Policing, then please provide us with a copy of the document in question (with any s31 and s40 redactions already highlighted) and we will consult with the relevant body on disclosure.

If nothing is identified as originating from or related to a s23 body or a national body, then we are happy for you to proceed with your own s31 and s40 assessment.

Kind regards



National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council



[REDACTED]

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox <[REDACTED]>
Sent: 03 September 2025 08:24
Subject: FW: CRU reference: 01/CRF/25/005224/B - National Centurion Data Request - Update

Good morning,

Further to yesterday's email, please see the below update in relation to this request from FIS:

"I have provided further clarification in relation to Part A of Question 3. We can isolate misconduct data and provide a name for any officers, however PSDs will likely need to cross reference this information with Corporate Communications data to be able to fully answer the question. This is because Centurion does not contain a field to outline whether the name of the officer was published."

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]
Management Assistant
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs' Council

[REDACTED]



From: NPCC CRU Mailbox
Sent: 02 September 2025 14:37
Subject: CRU reference: 01/CRF/25/005224/B - National Centurion Data Request

Good afternoon,

We are aware that the below FOI request has been received by forces:

Sent from: [REDACTED]
Log No. 01/CRF/25/005224/B

The Applicant name is included in the acknowledgement email as a reference for forces only, any future correspondence will only quote the CRU reference number. Please do not duplicate the applicant name in any future correspondence and use only the CRU reference number

Request:

1. What is your current policy regarding the publication of details for upcoming police misconduct hearings?
 - Specifically, when are these details made available on your website?
 - How long are they retained and publicly accessible prior to the hearing?
2. Following the conclusion of a misconduct hearing:
 - When is the outcome published on your website?
 - How long is the outcome retained in a publicly accessible format?

- What are the reasons and criteria for withdrawing this information from public view?
- At what point is the information removed from a format that is searchable by the public?

Report to be run by FIS for Q3

3. For each of the following reporting years:

2020–2021, 2021–2022, 2022–2023, 2023–2024, 2024–2025

- Please provide the number of misconduct outcomes in which the name of the police officer involved was published
- and the number of misconduct hearings where misconduct was found.

We have notified [Force Information Systems](#) (FIS) of the request and they will now prepare a report to extract the data from Centurion, for use by all force Professional Standard Departments. Please make your PSD aware of the request in line with your usual processes, and that a report will be available on the member's area of FIS website. This will be 10 days from us notifying FIS today. FIS will notify your PSD independently when this is ready.

Please note we do not require acknowledgement from forces that they have received this request, and **CRU advice is not currently being prepared.**

Should you require CRU advice for this please refer in the usual way.

Kind regards,

[Redacted]
Management Assistant
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs' Council

[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]



[Large redacted block of text]

[REDACTED]

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox <[REDACTED]>
Sent: 23 September 2025 11:24
Subject: FW: CRU reference: 01/CRF/25/005303/Z - Number of money mules/money laundering cases - Request logged - Advice to Follow

Dear All,

The below FOI request has now been logged in the CRU and will be treated as a national request. Advice will be sent to all forces in due course.

Please note we do not require confirmation that it has been received by your force.

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]
Management Assistant
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs' Council



From: NPCC CRU Mailbox
Sent: 19 September 2025 13:43
To: 'Metropolitan FOI ([REDACTED])'
Subject: CRU reference: 01/CRF/25/005303/Z - Your reference: 01/FOI/25/047555/T - Number of money mules/money laundering cases - Request logged - Advice to Follow

Dear All,

The below FOI request has now been logged in the CRU. Advice will follow in due course.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005303/Z
Referred by: Metropolitan Police Service
Sent from: [REDACTED]

The Applicant name is included in the acknowledgement email as a reference for forces only, any future correspondence will only quote the CRU reference number. Please do not duplicate the applicant name in any future correspondence and use only the CRU reference number

Applicant's request:

1. How many money mules/money laundering cases have been investigated by your force in the last 5 years involving children or young people (under 30 years of age)? If known, how many of these children/young people were students?
2. What is the average value of money transferred in money mules/money laundering cases you have investigated in the last 5 years involving children/young people?
3. What are the most common methods used by criminals to recruit money mules that you have identified in the last

5 years involving children/young people?

4. How many money mule/money laundering investigations have you referred to the Crown Prosecution Service in the last 5 years involving children/young people?

5. What is the approximately the average length of time it takes for a money laundering case to be investigated by your force in the last 5 years involving children/young people?

6. What is the average age and gender of money mules targeted under your jurisdiction in the last 5 years?

7. Are there any particular demographics or groups that are disproportionately targeted by money laundering/money mule schemes in you jurisdiction?

8. Do you participate in any international, national or regional initiatives or programmes to combat money muling?

9. Do you participate in any educational sessions/training for students in schools, colleges or universities?

Kind regards,

[Redacted]

Management Assistant

National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit

National Police Chiefs' Council

[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]



[Redacted]

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox [REDACTED]
Sent: 12 September 2025 11:06
Subject: Invitation to Free FOI & SAR Practitioners Workshop – Hosted by NPFDU
Importance: High

Dear colleagues,

At NPFDU, we recognise the value of continuous professional development and are proud to regularly host our Practitioners Conference for forces across the country.

This year, I was keen to offer something more focused—a dedicated one-day workshop specifically for our FOI and SAR practitioners. The aim is to create space for deeper discussion and practical exploration of key issues affecting our work.

While I had hoped to deliver this event at no cost, it proved challenging to secure a hosting police force. Fortunately, eCase kindly stepped in to sponsor the workshop, allowing us to run it in collaboration and keep it free of charge for attendees, bar travelling costs.

To be clear, this is not an endorsement of eCase (NPFDU uses a different case management system), but their ongoing support for FOI and SAR professionals—including free training and their annual FOI conference—made this partnership possible.

We warmly invite you to take advantage of this opportunity. NPFDU looks forward to welcoming colleagues from across our policing teams for a day of learning, sharing, and connection.

If you haven't already, please secure your place at next month's workshop—we'd love to see you there. Please do forward on to the appropriate teams. Details below:

Secure Your Spot – Police FOI & SAR Workshop

Join fellow Police FOI and SAR practitioners this October for a full-day, hands-on workshop in Birmingham, delivered by the NPFDU and supported by eCase.

This event is built for you. Tackle complex requests. Learn practical ways to improve response times. Share, learn, and collaborate with peers from forces across the UK.

What's in Store:

- **Interactive sessions** on AI, personal data, deceased persons, and managing burden (vexatious/manifestly unfounded)
- **Roundtable discussions** on boosting performance and tackling blockers
- **1:1 eCase clinics** on performance tools, including how to use AI safely and securely
- **Meet the team at NPFDU** ask us questions and get to know who is on the other side of the emails

Event Details:

- **Date:** [REDACTED]
- **Time:** 9:15 AM – 4:30 PM (followed by a drinks reception until 5:30 PM)
- **Venue:** [REDACTED]
- **Cost:** Free
- **Tickets:** 3 per force initially (waiting list available)

Places are filling fast - **reserve your spot today to ensure you don't miss out.**

[Book your place](#)

Warm regards

[Redacted]

(Pronoun: she/her [why have I put this?](#))

[Redacted]

Head of National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit

[Redacted]

[Redacted]



[Redacted]

[Redacted]

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox <[REDACTED]>
Sent: 03 September 2025 07:21
Subject: OS - CRU 25/5110 - Anduril Industries

OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

Apologies for the wait on this. Please see below advice:

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005110/S
Referred by: National

Applicant's request

1. Please provide copies of the following documents and/or reports relating to Anduril Industries tools (Lattice OS, Command and Control, drones/UAV/UAS, Pulsar, Wisp, sentry towers, etc.) that your police force has access to, whether they are internal or external:

- *Data Protection Assessments*
- *Memorandums of Understanding between your police force and other organisations*
- *Equality Impact Assessments*
- *Internal data retention/deletion policies*
- *Pilot/trial scheme evaluation reports*
- *Comparison reports with any potential alternatives*

2. Please also declare any future plans (with specific dates, if possible) to test, trial, and/or deploy tools from Anduril Industries including any internal/external reports which contain information on this matter.

CRU Advice

As always, the following is given on the proviso that s12 is not relevant.

This is the first FOI request we appear to have received in respect of ANDURIL technologies. Our understanding is that ANDURIL Industries is a defence technology company that develops advanced autonomous systems integrated through its AI-powered software platform, Lattice OS, which brings together data from sources such as sensors, drones and vehicles.

We are not aware of any forces using ANDURIL, but it would appear it is contracted by the [Home Office](#) (border security), and the MoD, about which there is some information available including via [WDTK](#). It is essentially military grade technology, but it does appear to have cross over capability into law enforcement and public safety. It is already used to assist border security, but it could be also be used for protection of critical infrastructure (nuclear power stations as an example), public event security, search and rescue.

Whilst we remain applicant and motive blind, it is easy to find articles that discuss the use of ANDURIL technologies:

[The UK's AI Borders: Anduril's Autonomous Surveillance Towers - Migrants' Rights Network](#)

Overall, ANDURIL seems straightforward enough as a capability. It is being used, but not in policing as far as we know.

For Q1, the request is asking for copies of documents and/or reports forces have *access to*, which is not strictly a question about whether or not you hold information. Obviously, if you hold such documents under FOI terms, then you have access also. However, having access to something, but not holding the information for the use by your own force, is not information held for the purpose of FOI per se. For example, all forces will have access to [the ANDURIL website](#), but that does not constitute information held unless your force saves the information from it and uses it for its own purpose. Simple access to information is not enough to qualify as information held.

More likely, and in accordance with what some practitioners have told us, the response to Q1 is “No Information Held” across the board. As I say, we are not aware of any forces using ANDURIL technologies at this present moment in time, and we see no overriding reason to cite NCND on the basis of this request. If any forces are, then please let the CRU know.

Q2 – Again we suspect that this is NIH. Please let us know if you have questions or concerns.

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]
Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs Council

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: 09 September 2025 09:26
Subject: OS - CRU 25/5123 - Plascan Sandcat

Categories: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

Apologies for delays. Please see below advice in relation to the following:

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005123/X
Referred by: National

Applicant's request

Please provide information held by your force regarding the procurement and use of Plasan Sandcat Tigris armoured vehicles (including any variant referred to as "Sandcat").

1. Procurement activity (October 2023 – present)

- a) The number of Sandcat Tigris (or Sandcat variant) vehicles ordered.*
- b) The number of such vehicles delivered and currently held by the force.*
- c) Please confirm explicitly if no such vehicles have been ordered, delivered, or are planned for purchase.*

2. Operational status

- a) Of any vehicles acquired, how many are available for deployment?*
- b) How many are not available for deployment (for example, undergoing modifications, repair, or awaiting approval)?*

If you consider releasing this information to be exempt under Section 31 (Law Enforcement) or any other FOIA exemption, please still release all other requested information and provide your reasoning and the outcome of the public interest test.

3. Financial expenditure

- a) The total cost (including VAT and any associated modifications, fittings, or logistics) for all Sandcat Tigris (or Sandcat variant) vehicles purchased in the above period.*
- b) If vehicles were ordered but payment is not yet complete, please confirm the current status of payments.*

4. Supplier/ procurement route

- a) For each purchase, please confirm whether it was made directly from Plasan Sasa Ltd or via the UK distributor Ricardo UK Ltd.*
- b) If supplier details are considered exempt under Section 43 (commercial interests) or Section 31 (law enforcement), please still release all other requested information and explain the exemption applied, including the public interest*

test outcome.

CRU Advice

The following is provided in line with the views of the NPCC Armed Policing Portfolio.

In brief:

- **We are aware that the MPS and Police Scotland have avowed purchasing the Plascan Sandcat variant.**
- **We are aware that a number of other forces have already, or are considering, purchasing Sandcat's. But at this time, we aren't aware of wide spread force publication about such information.**
- **We know not all forces will hold information for this request. However;**
- **We are advising that all forces other than the MPS/Police Scotland respond NCND s24(2) and s31(3).**

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A form of words to assist with the NCND s24(2) and s31(3)

Harm in complying with Section 1(1)(a) – to confirm or nor whether information is held

The Police Service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. In order to achieve these objectives we are allowed to use reasonable force where necessary to do so. In the ultimate circumstance this can include the use of lethal force but the rule of thumb is to use the minimum amount necessary to achieve the objective. In reality this equates to the use of the minimum amount of force required to overcome the violence, used or threatened, by those wishing to cause harm.

As part of this equation we also have to pay heed to the Human Rights Convention particularly Article 2 – The Right to life. The law and regulations relating to the use of force are detailed within the [Authorised Professional Practice \(APP\) document for Armed Policing](#).

Armed Policing is a highly specialised area of firearms deployment and weapons training. It is an emotive subject under constant scrutiny and, by default, is always in the public eye. There is a long history of excellent practice nationally and Armed Policing is regarded as being at the forefront of firearms issues.

Any release under FOIA is a disclosure to the world, not just to the individual making the request. To confirm or not that information is held in relation to this request would reveal whether or not FORCE NAME has Plascan Sandcat armoured vehicles. Such awareness would reveal tactical capability and is likely to influence the criminals, which may include terrorists or terrorist organisations, who are prepared to resort to the use of extreme force in order to avoid detection and capture. By fully knowing whether or not these vehicles are used by FORCE NAME will enable offenders to ensure they are armed in a way as to overcome the police response.

This creates if you will an 'arms race' to the detriment of the criminals themselves, as the use of lethal weapons becomes more and more the only resolution option, and endangers both the public and officers themselves. This is best evidenced by the fact that the United Kingdom, even in these violent times, has been able to maintain a basically unarmed Police Service, with the resulting benefits this delivers when compared with other countries, such as America, where armed conflict resolution with law enforcement agencies depends on who has the most effective weapons.

Furthermore, the threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. The current UK threat level from international terrorism, based on intelligence, is assessed as [Substantial](#), which means that a terrorist attack is likely.

In order to counter criminal and terrorist behaviour it is vital that the police have the ability to adopt techniques and procedures commensurate with the perceived threat, and deploy accordingly. The prevention and detection of crime is the foundation upon which policing is built and the police have a clear responsibility to prevent crime, arrest those responsible for committing crime or those that plan to commit crime. However, there is also a duty of care to the public at large. The UK Police Service has a positive undertaking to protect the public from harm and that duty of care to all involved must be the overriding consideration.

The protection of the public is of paramount importance and FORCE NAME will not divulge whether information is or is not held if to do so could compromise Law Enforcement.

Public Interest Considerations

Section 24(2) National Security

Factors for disclosure

The public are entitled to know why decisions are made and how resources are distributed within an area of policing. Confirmation would inform the public that the police provide an appropriate level of tactical armed response when required. This would provide transparency with regard to the use of public funds inasmuch as the funds are being used correctly and appropriately ensuring the Armed Policing Departments within individual forces are equipped adequately.

Factors against disclosure

Whilst there is a public interest in providing reassurance that the police are appropriately and effectively dealing with threats posed by terrorist organisations, there is a strong public interest in safeguarding national security and the welfare and safety of the general public.

Taking into account the current security climate within the United Kingdom, no information which may aid a terrorist should be disclosed. To what extent this information may aid a terrorist is unknown, but it is clear that it will have an impact on a force's ability to monitor terrorist activity. The public entrust the Police Service to make appropriate decisions with regard to their safety and protection, as well as the safety of their officers and staff. The only way of reducing risk is to be cautious with what is placed into the public domain. Confirmation or denial has the potential to undermine ongoing and future operations to protect the Security of the United Kingdom, e.g. counter terrorism activity. The risk of significant harm or even death to the community at large would be increased.

Any incident that results from such a disclosure would by default affect National Security.

Section 31

Factors for disclosure

There is a public interest in being made aware of all the facts relating to Armed Policing in order to ensure complete openness and transparency as there is often speculation and rumour with regard to the use of firearms within the Police Service. In this case revealing whether or not specific armoured vehicles are in service force-by-force would provide transparency and may enhance public debate into this area of policing.

Factors against disclosure

The deployment of authorised firearms officers is measured and authorised by chief officers after careful consideration in order to protect the public and apprehend individuals who use lethal weapons as part of their criminality. To confirm or deny information is held would reveal tactical capability, or lack thereof, which places the police at a tactical disadvantage. In addition, confirmation or denial may also 'create' a fear of crime within the general public relating to armed policing.

FORCE NAME has a duty of care to the community at large and public safety is of paramount importance. If an FOI disclosure revealed information to the world (by citing an exemption or stating no information held) that would undermine the security of the National Infrastructure, offenders, including terrorist organisations, could use this to their advantage which would compromise public safety and more worryingly encourage offenders to carry out further crimes.

The risk to public safety cannot be ignored and FORCE NAME has a responsibility to ensure safety of individuals is protected at all times, as detailed within the harm.

Balancing Test

Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing resources for specialist departments and providing reassurance that the Police Service is appropriately and effectively placing resources into Armed Policing, there is a strong public interest in knowing that policing activity with regard to the delivery of law enforcement is appropriate and balanced, this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances.

In addition, we also need to take into account the victims of terrorism. Public safety is of paramount importance and any information which would place individuals at risk and compromise the National Security of the United Kingdom, no matter how generic, is not in the public interest. The effective delivery of operational law enforcement and the National Security of the UK is crucial and of a fundamental duty to FORCE NAME. Any disclosure would have a negative impact on law enforcement and national security.

As much as there is a public interest in knowing that the delivery of law enforcement is appropriate and balanced, this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. Therefore it is our opinion that for these issues the balance test outweighs the need to confirm information is held and falls in favour of issuing a neither confirm nor deny refusal.

No inference can be taken from this refusal that information does or does not exist.

[END]

Kind regards,


Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs Council



From: NPCC CRU Mailbox [REDACTED]
Sent: 18 September 2025 08:10
Subject: OS - CRU 25/5205 - Various policing costs

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005205/Y
Referred by: for info - Advice sent National

Applicant's request:

I am writing to request information on the costs incurred by your force via the following activities. Please treat each activity as a separate request, meaning that, where information for one is unavailable, please provide me with information on the others. Please only provide me with information dating between 1 July 2024 and 20 August 2025.

- 1. The prosecution of members of Palestine Action under counter-terror laws;*
- 2. The prosecution of members of Palestine Action under laws which do not constitute counter-terror laws;*
- 3. Any counter-terror measures utilised to carry out arrests of Palestine Action members.*
- 4. Any counter-terror measures utilised to carry out investigations into Palestine Action members;*
- 5. Any counter-terror measures utilised to carry out assessments of Palestine Action as a group, namely, whether it is a terrorist organisation;*
- 6. Any counter-terror measures utilised to detain members of Palestine Action;*

If the above can be broken down into the operations targeting each of the following, please do so.

So, if an investigation was carried out into individuals included in (a), (b),

(c) and (i), please clarify that, where appropriate, for example. Please note costs unrelated to (a)-(m) below as 'Other' and provide a brief description of where the costs stemmed from, if possible.

a. Jordan Devlin, 30, of Stoke Newington High Street, London b. Charlotte Head, 28, of Upper Clapton Road, Hackney, London c. Leona Kamio, 28, of Clifden Road, Hackney, London d. Fatema Rajwani, 20, of Commonside, East Mitcham, Merton e. Zoe Rogers, 20, of Selborne Road, Southgate, Enfield f. Hannah Davidson, 51, of Calder Gardens, Edinburgh g. Ian Sanders, 45, of Regent Place, Royal Leamington Spa h. William Plastow, 33, of High Croft Avenue, Manchester i. Madeline Norman, 29, of Wester Drylaw Drive, Edinburgh j. Samuel Corner, 22, of Rock Hill, Georgeham, Devon was also charged with GBH with intent and two counts of ABH k. The four people arrested in this case: Four activists who staged protests outside a defence firm have been arrested.

l. The arrests made in relation to the break-in at RAF Brize Norton.

m. Arrests made in protests showing support for Palestine Action.

CRU Advice:

Question 1 – 6 – The applicant is asking for cost information. But some of the questions aren't particularly clear. For example, the "cost of counter terror measures utilised to carry out arrests" at Q3 doesn't make immediate sense to us. However, the nature of the questions leads us to suspect that forces simply won't hold the information requested and would have no reason to do so.

A No Information Held response with a brief explanation that the force does not record cost information as requested seems reasonable. We don't feel that this would undermine other options in response to questions about counter terrorism policing.

The second part of the request where the names are listed, isn't a request for information per se. The applicant appears to be talking about costs associated with these individuals if indeed any information is held for questions 1 – 6. Whilst the names are [in the public domain](#) we advise removing mention of them from response letters.

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]
Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox [REDACTED]
Sent: 22 September 2025 10:48
Cc: '#Freedom of Information Requests'; 'Freedom of Information'; 'FOI-Team';
'foi@cambs.police.uk'; [REDACTED] PS2366'; 'Cheshire'; 'City of London - FOI'; 'Information Rights Requests'; 'FOI'; 'Cumbria Constabulary FOI'; [REDACTED]
'FOI@Derbyshire.police.uk'; 'Devon and Cornwall'; 'Dorset'; 'Doverport'; 'Durham'; 'Dyfed-Powys';
'Info Rights Freedom Essex'; 'Freedom.Information@gloucestershire.police.uk'; 'Greater Manchester FOI'; 'FreedomOfInformation'; 'PUBLIC ACCESS Mailbox'; 'FOI@herts.police.uk';
'FOIRequests@homeoffice.gov.uk'; 'Humberside'; 'Freedom of Information Kent'; 'Lancashire FOI';
'FOI'; 'foi@lincs.police.uk'; 'MDP-FOI-DP (MULTIUSER)'; 'Merseyside FOI'; 'Metropolitan FOI';
[REDACTED]; 'Freedom Of Information (Norfolk)'; 'Freedom of Information Team'; 'North Yorkshire FOI'; 'Freedom of Information'; 'Northumbria FOI';
'freedomofinformation@notts.police.uk'; 'NPCC FOI Request Mailbox'; 'NPCC Media ** DO NOT REMOVE FROM FORCE CONTACTS **'; 'PSNI Generic Mailbox'; 'FOI'; 'Information@south-wales.police.uk'; 'South Yorkshire'; 'Freedom of Information'; 'States of Jersey - [REDACTED] f';
'States of Jersey - [REDACTED]'; 'INFORMATION@suffolk.police.uk'; 'Freedom of Information (Surrey)'; 'FOI@sussex.police.uk'; 'Public Access TV';
'CRUadviceWarks@Warwickshire.police.uk'; 'West Mercia FOI'; 'foi@westmidlands.police.uk';
'Freedom of Information'; 'Wiltshire FOI'
Subject: OS - CRU 25/5300 - Human bodies and remains
Attachments: Log No. 621/24 - Britt - CRU Circulation (28/06/2024) - Unidentified Bodies - Including Advice of s12 is not relevant

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU
Dear All,

We are circulating this for awareness only. We don't know if the request below has been tailored and sent to multiple forces, but it is a reminder about advice given previously (see attached) that there is no immediate harm in responding to requests seeking to know the number of investigations into unidentified bodies/remains. However, where the request asks for data in respect of human bodies/remains held in custody of the force, that would be a NIH response.

Subject to local assessment, we have no overriding concerns with this request.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005300/W
Referred by: South Yorks Police
Applicant: [REDACTED]

Applicant's request:

Request for Information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 I am writing to request information concerning unidentified bodies or remains within the jurisdiction of South Yorkshire police over the past five years, and the current status. Please provide the following information:

1. How many unidentified bodies or sets of human remains have been discovered in South Yorkshire from 2020 until now for which identity has not been established.

1a. Of those, how many remain unidentified as of the date of this request.

I understand that according to the National Crime Agency or Missing Persons databases there is currently just one

unidentified body dating from 1994.

2. Is this number correct or have you added to them in the years since 1994?

3. Whether there are any future plans to try to find out who these missing people might be.

If parts of this information are not held by South Yorkshire Police, please indicate whether they are held by another body (for example, Sheffield Coroners Service, Sheffield city council, Doncaster city council or Barnsley council).

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]
Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs Council

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox [REDACTED]
Sent: 25 September 2025 07:01
Subject: OS - CRU 25/5320 CSE data

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

The Applicant name is included in the acknowledgement email as a reference for forces only, any future correspondence will only quote the CRU reference number. Please do not duplicate the applicant name in any future correspondence and use only the CRU reference number

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU on 24/9/25. **Please let us know if you have received it.**

Initial advice is below.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005320/A
Referred by: Gwent
Applicant: [REDACTED]

Applicant's request:

Primary request: record-level dataset

Please provide record-level (row-by-row) data for all CSE-related crimes in your force area for each calendar year 2010–2024 inclusive (and 2025 year-to-date if available).

A) Scope / definition

- Confirm the operational definition of “Child Sexual Exploitation (CSE)” and whether you use a CSE flag/marker.
- If no CSE flag exists, please state which Home Office offence codes or crime classifications you use to identify CSE offences (e.g., grooming, arranging/facilitating child sexual offences, sexual communication with a child, controlling child prostitution/indecency, etc.).

B) Requested dataset fields (record-level, anonymised)

For each relevant record, please include:

- Year of offence/record
- Crime classification/offence code
- Outcome code (Home Office outcome type, with description if available)
- Arrest made (Y/N)
- Suspect sex (M/F/Other/Unknown)
- Suspect ethnicity (classification used by force)
- Suspect nationality (if recorded; if not, state “not recorded”)
- Suspect religion (if recorded; if not, state “not recorded”)
- CPS referral (Y/N)
- CPS charging decision (if recorded by police)

C) Format

- Please supply data in machine-readable CSV with a data dictionary (field definitions, code lists, outcome

descriptions).

- Remove any direct personal identifiers (names, DOB, addresses, case numbers).

Fallback request: aggregated data

If providing the above record-level dataset would:

- exceed the s.12 cost limit,
 - or be refused under s.40 (personal information) or s.31 (law enforcement),
- then please instead provide annual aggregated totals for 2010–2024 (and 2025 YTD):*

- 1. Number of recorded crimes meeting your CSE definition.*
- 2. Outcomes for those crimes by Home Office outcome type.*
- 3. Number of arrests of suspects, broken down by:*
 - o Sex (M/F/Other/Unknown)*
 - o Ethnicity (force's classification)*
 - o Nationality (if recorded)*
 - o Religion (if recorded)*
- 4. Number of CPS referrals for charging decisions.*
- 5. CPS charging decisions recorded by police (Charge/Alternative charge/No further action/Out of court/etc.).*

Assistance

- *If full coverage from 2010 is not available, please provide data from the earliest year held.*
- *If any field is not held, please confirm explicitly (s.1(1)(a)).*
- *If partial data is possible, please release what you hold and advise under s.16 how to refine further.*

I confirm I am requesting only non-identifiable information for research purposes

CRU Advice:

The start of the request is for a definition of CSE, and we suspect forces will be using the definition as can be found via the College of Policing at [Responding to child sexual exploitation | College of Policing](#).

Next, the applicant is asking for single record data across annual periods from 2010 onwards, which is likely to result in most forces establishing this to be excess Cost under s12.

But further down the request the applicant addresses that s12 will be the likely outcome and provides a refined request, which is still likely to exceed Cost even though they require aggregated data as opposed to single record data.

However, putting excess Cost to one side, practitioners would need to locally assess the data and determine whether it is capable to leading to the identification of any individual, or would otherwise compromise a live investigation if given out (sections 40 and 31 respectively).

Overall, in the event s12 is not relevant, please let us know if we can assist you further. We welcome sight of any draft responses where disclosure is being considered so we can understand how the data might look. But at present we are not suggesting a partial NCND s23(3). However, this may well be taken into further consideration.

Kind regards,


Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs Council


[REDACTED]

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox <[REDACTED]>
Sent: 22 September 2025 12:48
Subject: RE: Invitation to Free FOI & SAR Practitioners Workshop – Hosted by NPFDU

Good Afternoon All

Time is flying by and it isn't long until our NPFDU Workshop for FOI and SARS.

I really do encourage you all to seek a place, NPFDU are hosting this event after overwhelming feedback and requests for practical workshops and training. Events like these will not be possible in the future without your contribution and attendance.

Any questions on the event, please do reach out and I hope to see many of you there.

Warm regards

[REDACTED]
(Pronoun: she/her [why have I put this?](#))

[REDACTED]
Head of National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit



National Police
Freedom of Information
and Data Protection Unit



[REDACTED]

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox [REDACTED]
Sent: 19 September 2025 12:51
Subject: CRU ref: 25/5194/M - DVI - Acknowledgement of receipt of information held

Categories: [REDACTED]

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

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Good afternoon,

Thank you for providing the information you hold for the above referenced case. I have informed the policing lead s12 is not relevant to your force and asked for further consultation, specifically on questions 1 & 2.

As soon as they respond, further advice will be formulated and circulated.

Kind regards

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council

[REDACTED]



This email contains information which is confidential and may also be privileged. It is for the exclusive use of the addressee(s) and any views or opinions expressed within are those of the originator and not necessarily those of the Force. If you are not the intended recipient(s) please note that any form of distribution, copying or use of this email or the information contained is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error please forward a copy to informationsecurity@thamesvalley.police.uk and to the sender. Please then delete the email and destroy any copies of it. DO NOT use this email address for other enquiries as it will not be responded to, nor any action taken upon it. If you have a non-urgent enquiry, please call the Police non-

[REDACTED]

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox [REDACTED]
Sent: 26 September 2025 15:37
Subject: CRU ref: 25/5194/M - DVI - Final Advice

Categories: [REDACTED]

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Good afternoon,

Our reference: 25/5194/M
Referred by: National

Further to advice circulated on 18th September, the below is provided to forces for whom s12 is not relevant or for whom revised requests have been received following s12 refusal. This has been compiled following consultation with the policing lead and incorporates their views.

Question 1:

In 2021 we advised that requests for the total number of trained DVI officers in the force be withheld. We have confirmed with the policing lead that this stance should be maintained. While it is accepted that DVI is not part of the first wave of response to an incident, it is a critical policing function in any serious incident response, and the lead confirms that on that basis the harm remains as it was in 2021, namely that where individual forces provide the number of officers currently trained in DVI, this would create a mosaic effect across the country showing areas of capability and vulnerability. This undermines operational policing. Therefore, we advise s31(1)(a)(b) is relevant to this question. A form of words for this can be found at the end of this advice.

Question 2:

The applicant asks for the total number of DVI officers deployed across a full 5-year period with a list of the types of incidents which have been attended. Following consultation, it is agreed there is no immediate harm in providing data for this question if held, this includes stating where no deployments have taken place. This is primarily because the request is for high level, historical deployment data which spans 5 years as a total and would not, in our view or the policing lead's, reflect the current DVI capability of the force. Having said that, there are a couple of points to make:

Individual assessment is advised before identifying any incident types which carry specific local sensitivities and thus for which s31 may need to be considered. Generally, considering the scale of incidents that require DVI trained officers to attend, and thus what is likely to be in the public domain about any such incident occurring we feel the risks are minimal from this perspective, but obviously we cannot know all individual force circumstances. Practitioners should therefore ensure this is checked with relevant business areas prior to disclosure.

As stated above, we do not believe the number of DVI trained officers deployed will reveal anything that shows current capability. However, there is no requirement to breakdown the number of officers deployed to each incident, or even to each incident type, so we recommend that any disclosure is simply a total number of officers deployed in the full 5 years (as 1 figure), with and a separate, generic list of incident types attended.

Question 3

We see no harm in answering this question.

Question 4

I don't believe forces will hold "typical" lengths of service as recorded information. Nor do I think there will be a "set" term someone is rostered into a DVI officer role, so this is likely to be NIH. However, there is no harm in stating you have no set term or tenure in the role, and should a force wish to provide a generic comment outside of the act as a gesture of goodwill about length of officer service (I note some propose to state officers routinely stay in post over 5 years) there would be no harm in doing that, if you choose to.

Question 5

No specific issues have been raised to us by the lead for this question, and we don't see any immediate harm in answering the question. Therefore, disclosure can be considered subject to individual force assessment.

Form of words s31(1)(a)(b) for Question 1:

Evidence of Harm:

DVI is a specialism held by police forces across the country in numbers sufficient that in the event of a disaster on the largest scale that sufficient DVI trained personnel can respond. However, to release details of the exact number of officers trained in DVI in a force-by-force manner would not only reveal individual force capability, but it would also create a mosaic effect across the country showing areas of capability and, more pertinently, potential vulnerability. It should be remembered that a release of information under FOI is not a private transaction, it is a disclosure to the world. It is known that criminals and those with criminal intent routinely monitor information made publicly available under FOI, consequently, for those that would seek to commit criminal acts, revealing the areas of capability and vulnerability could then be used to gain an advantage resulting in further criminal activity which places the public at increased risk.

Public Interest test

Factors favouring disclosure:

Disclosure of this information would adhere to the basic principle of being open and transparent and would provide better awareness which may in turn reassure the public.

Factors favouring non-disclosure:

Where the current or future law enforcement role of the police may be compromised by the release of information, the effectiveness of the police service will be reduced. Providing the requested information would allow those who seek to commit criminal acts the ability to understand operational capabilities of police forces. This would undermine police resources in their primary function of law enforcement and public protection, ultimately putting the public at risk. Any disclosure of information which would undermine the Police service's ability to serve the public and protect them from harm is not in the public interest to disclose.

Kind regards



National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council

[REDACTED]

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox [REDACTED] >
Sent: 20 September 2025 12:07
Subject: FW: CRU ref: 25/5194/M - DVI - wording error on original advice - clarification
Categories: [REDACTED]

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Good morning all,

In reference to the below advice circulation, it has been brought to my attention that some information was included at the very end of the email which should not have been, and that its inclusion has caused some confusion.

For clarification, none of the information beyond the first signature block should have been included on the advice. These were initial draft lines and information intended for the policing lead consultation only – they are not for forces to use. Please therefore disregard these lines entirely.

Sincere apologies that this was not picked up before the advice was issued and for any confusion it has caused.

Kind regards

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council

[REDACTED]



From: NPCC CRU Mailbox
Sent: 18 September 2025 13:25
Subject: CRU ref: 25/5194/M - DVI - Including Advice

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. Advice is at the end of this message.

Our reference: 25/5194/M

Referred by: National

Applicant's request:

I would like to request the following information relating to Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) provision within your force.

- Where possible, please provide total counts disaggregated by gender where this information is recorded. I generally expect yes/no responses, but any additional context would be gratefully appreciated.
- 1. Staffing and Deployment
- * The number of officers/staff currently trained in DVI within your force (please indicate gender if recorded).
- * The number of DVI-trained officers/staff deployed in the last five years, and the categories of incidents they were deployed to (please group as: terrorism, transport incidents, industrial accidents, and natural disasters) - total numbers only, to preserve anonymity.
- * Which department or unit within the force is responsible for DVI planning and deployment.
- * The typical length of service an officer/staff member remains active on the DVI roster once trained (e.g., average number of years, or whether there is a set term).
- * Whether your force applies any suitability checks or criteria prior to deployment of DVI-trained officers (e.g., health, psychological readiness, or operational availability).

CRU Advice:

Following consultation with the policing lead, we have been advised that this request is likely to exceed the cost limits of the act. Question 2 specifically asks for information which the national leads feel will not be held in a readily retrievable format. To locate and retrieve all this information, a manual check of every incident will be required to establish if DVI trained officers have been deployed and further, how many. Given the scope of incidents to which a DVI trained officer may be deployed and the timeframe of the request, it is felt that this manual review will exceed 18 hours of work and thus s12 will be applicable. As all questions in the request are on materially similar subject matter, where s12 applies to one question it can be applied to the request as a whole.

At this stage we therefore advise s12 is relevant. In providing this response, we recommend you offer advice and assistance where you see fit.

If s12 is not relevant to your force, please provide us with the information you hold and any comments from your force teams on suitability for disclosure and we will then refer back to the policing lead for further views. In this instance, and given further consultation will be required, we recommend you PIT extend the request where possible. A form of words is below if it assists.

PIT wording:

'The FOI Act obliges a public authority to respond to requests promptly and in any case no later than 20 working days after receiving your request. The first consideration is whether we can comply with s1(1)(a) of the Act, which is our duty to confirm whether or not the information requested is held, secondly we must comply with s1(1)(b), which is the provision of such information. However, when a qualified exemption applies either to the confirmation, or denial or to the information itself, and the public interest test is engaged, section 17(2) of the Act allows the time for responding to be extended to longer than 20 working days, if the balance of such public interest is yet to be determined.'

In this case we have not yet reached a decision on where the balance of the public interest lies in respect of either of the above obligations. We estimate that it will take an additional [xx] days to take a decision on where this balance lies. Therefore, we plan to let you have a response by [date]. If it appears that it will take longer than this to reach a conclusion, you will be kept informed.'

The specific exemption(s) which apply in relation to your request is/are: [include a brief explanation of why it/they apply unless it is not apparent or unless you are not required to do so by virtue of s17(4)].

Insert usual complaint information.'

Kind regards



National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council



Q1 - When we consulted with policing leads in 2021, it was agreed that the total number of DVI trained officers per force was not suitable for release and should be withheld to protect tactical capability. Having re-checked with UKDVI, this remains the case. This question therefore requires exemption by virtue of s31(1)(a)(b). A form of words can be found at the end of this advice.

Q2 – The applicant asks for the number of DVI trained officers deployed over a 5-year period, further they request a breakdown of these numbers by incident type.

I think it is likely there would be public acknowledgment and/or media coverage for any incident of the scale for which DVI trained officers were required to attend, so the risk in providing a generic list of incident categories attended by DCI officers in general over a 5-year period (with no dates, total number of incidents or further information about them) would not seem particularly harmful.

However, in terms of providing the number of officers deployed,

Further providing this broken down by incident type:

In terms of providing the total number of DVI trained officers who have attended each category (as a total over 5 years for each), although harm seems somewhat mitigated because it does not ask about individual deployments, considering the approach taken to Q1 and the fact disclosed figures would represent the level of DVI officer deployment at *different types of incident* (which could be argued to reveal operational capability) do you believe exemptions should be applied to officer numbers deployed to each incident category? If you do, we would appreciate your reasoning for this and rationale in as much detail as possible so we can formulate accurate advice to all forces. If you do not feel it is harmful to disclose these figures against the list of incidents, perhaps because it represents past deployments, or the number of officers deployed to an incident is dynamic and case by case not formulaic, then we would be grateful for that confirmation also.

Q3 – We see no specific harm in answering this question.

Q4 – The applicant asks for the “typical” length of service of a DVI officer. Such information is not likely to be held as recorded information and so a NIH response should be provided.

Q5 – Overall we cannot see harm in providing a response, however we recommend forces locally assess what is held to ensure no operational sensitivities are captured.

Wording - [2021/24282 - DVI | Gwent Police, foi-2021-563_disaster-victim-identification.pdf](#), [Disaster Victim Identification - 566/2021 | Dyfed-Powys Police](#),

S31 Harm and PIT wording

Evidence of Harm:

The police service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. The release of any operational capability in terms of numbers of trained DVI personnel could undermine that position. Whilst not questioning the motives of any one applicant that may request this information, it must be appreciated that a release under FOI is a disclosure to the world.

DVI is a specialism held by many police forces across the country, in numbers sufficient that in the event of a disaster on the largest scale that sufficient DVI trained personnel can respond.

However, disclosure of the exact number of DVI trained personnel currently in the force would undermine operational capability, providing those that would seek to commit criminal acts, information as to the current police DVI resources

Kind regards



National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council



This email contains information which is confidential and may also be privileged. It is for the exclusive use of the addressee(s) and any views or opinions expressed within are those of the originator and not necessarily those of the Force. If you are not the intended recipient(s) please note that any form of distribution, copying or use of this email or the information contained is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error please forward a copy to

Tot:

Subject: [REDACTED]

本学は、この「教育の質」を、

Please drop in at any time between 11-12 and a member of the team will be available. If after an initial discussion the CRU feel it requires more time, they will advise accordingly.

We hope these sessions will enable quicker access to us and provide additional support which we may be able to support after a brief chat.

Date: Every Tuesday and Thursday from 7th January

Feel free to come by at your convenience. We look for

Best regards,

Control Ratio

NFTDU

US&data=05%2C32%2C7randomizationTime%40sortby=despolice.id%7C34ca43de9b6d4d0979a508ad0f2fbce%3C4d0b17ba10d43bd8d

Meeting ID: [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox [REDACTED] >
Sent: 16 September 2025 08:06
To: Freedom of Information Team
Subject: FW: NWP review referral
Attachments: Log No.000824/23 CRU Circulation (18/07/2023) - Including Advice; DISCLOSURE .pdf; Response Doc(1).docx; 2025-874 Spend on external (physical) forensic services.pdf; CRU_Referral_Criteria_and_Form_v10.4.docx

Categories: [REDACTED]

Hi [REDACTED]

Thank you for the email. The applicant requests information about forensic services, but not to include digital forensics. As the advice attach states, we don't have an issue with wet forensics and naming the service supplier. Likewise, much of the information can be found if looked for, such as via the UKAS website - [23321Testing Single](#). However, when it comes to Digital Forensics we advise against naming the supplier within FOI so as not to have all forces simultaneously reveal the most critical supplier. This is because of the cyber threat to these areas, for example Eurofins was subject to a ransomware attack around 2017, and there is obviously a lot of police digital material held by such providers.

I trust that helps.

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]
Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs Council



From: Freedom of Information Team <FreedomofInformationTeam@northwales.police.uk>
Sent: 12 September 2025 13:28
To: NPCC CRU Mailbox [REDACTED] >
Subject: NWP review referral

Hi,

Please find attached a review request referral form, our response, previous advice and responses from Gwent and Dyfed Powys supplied by the applicant.

Many thanks,



[Redacted]
Swyddog Hawliau Gwybodaeth | Information Rights Officer
Sicrwydd gwybodaeth | Information Assurance
Heddlu Gogledd Cymru | North Wales Police



Yn gwneud Gogledd Cymru'r lle mwyaf diogel i fyw, gweithio ac ymweld yn y DU
Making North Wales the safest place to live, work and visit in the UK

Rydym yn croesawu gohebiaeth yn y Gymraeg a'r Saesneg – byddwn yn ymateb yn gyfartal i'r ddau ac yn ateb yn eich dewis iaith heb oedi.
We welcome correspondence in Welsh and English – we will respond equally to both and will reply in your language of choice without delay.

This email contains information which is confidential and may also be privileged. It is for the exclusive use of the addressee(s) and any views or opinions expressed within are those of the originator and not necessarily those of the Force. If you are not the intended recipient(s) please note that any form of distribution, copying or use of this email or the information contained is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error please forward a copy to informationsecurity@thamesvalley.police.uk and to the sender. Please then delete the email and destroy any copies of it. DO NOT use this email address for other enquiries as it will not be responded to, nor any action taken upon it. If you have a non-urgent enquiry, please call the Police non-emergency number 101. If it is an emergency, please call 999. Thank you.



FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST 2025/28810

Dear requester,

Thank you for your recent request under the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

Section 1 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) places two duties on public authorities. Unless exemptions apply, the first duty at, **Section 1(1) (a)**, is to confirm or deny whether the information specified in a request is held. The second duty at, **Section 1 (1) (b)**, is to disclose information that has been confirmed as being held.

The information that you are seeking is in relation to the following:

REQUEST

Dear Freedom of Information Officer,

I am writing to you under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 to request the following information for the most recent financial year for which data is available:

Please provide the total amount in £ (excluding VAT) that your force has spent on **external physical (traditional) forensic science services. Do not include any spend on digital forensics.** I request that this is broken down into categories based on the **Lot Code** and **description** specified in the contract(s) awarded to your private forensic science provider suppliers.

For each category, please include:

1. The Lot Code (as per the contract)
2. The Lot description (e.g., DNA Crime Stains)
3. The total spend (£, ex VAT)
4. The supplier name

For example:

Lot X | DNA Crime Stains | £1,000,000 | Eurofins Forensic Services

Lot Y | Toxicology | £500,000 | Cellmark Forensic Services

RESPONSE

Please see the chart immediately below with the overall total being £885,201



Gwent	L301 PACE DNA	L302 Crime Scene DNA	L303 Casework DNA	L304 Fire Investigation	L307 Drugs	L311a Toxicology (RTA)	L311b Toxicology (Casework)	L312 Casework	L313 M&T	TOTAL
CELLMARK	£0	£0	£141,873	£3,107	£0	£160,832	£14,676	£21,491	£19,613	£361,592
EUROFINS	£0	£9,819	£33,811	£0	£0	£0	£8,087	£5,747	£0	£57,464
KEY	£69,788	£0	£384,837	£0	£9,059	£0	£0	£2,461	£0	£466,145
TOTAL	£69,788	£9,819	£560,521	£3,107	£9,059	£160,832	£22,763	£29,699	£19,613	£885,201

Notes

Period: 1 April 2024 - 31
March 2025

Please note, every effort is made to ensure that the figures presented are accurate and complete.

Freedom of Information Act is a public disclosure regime, not a private regime. Any information disclosed under the Act is thereafter deemed to be in the public domain, and therefore freely available to the public and will be published on the Gwent Police website.

If, upon receiving a response to a freedom of information request, you are unhappy with the outcome, you may request an internal review. **This should be made within 40 working days of the initial response.**

Please direct any internal review requests to FOI@gwent.police.uk

You have the right to request an appeal from the Information Commissioners Office about your Freedom of Information request, if you are dissatisfied with your internal review response.

ICO Contact Details:

The Information Commissioner's Office, Wycliffe House, Wilmslow, Cheshire, SK9 5AF

Tel: 0303 123 1113

Web: www.ico.org.uk

Thank you for your interest in Gwent Police.



HEDDLU
GOGLEDD CYMRU
NORTH WALES
POLICE

Response Date:04/09/2025

2025/874 - Spend on external (physical) forensic services

In response to your recent request for information regarding;

for the most recent financial year for which data is available:

Please provide the total amount in £ (excluding VAT) that your force has spent on external physical (traditional) forensic science services. Do not include any spend on digital forensics. I request that this is broken down into categories based on the Lot Code and description specified in the contract(s) awarded to your private forensic science provider suppliers.

For each category, please include:

- 1. The Lot Code (as per the contract)**
- 2. The Lot description (e.g., DNA Crime Stains)**
- 3. The total spend (£, ex VAT)**
- 4. The supplier name**

For example:

Lot X | DNA Crime Stains | £1,000,000 | Eurofins Forensic Services

Lot Y | Toxicology | £500,000 | Cellmark Forensic Services

	FY 24/25 Total
*	
Lot 303 - Other DNA	£114,870.13
Lot 302 - Other Crime Stains	£77,462.12
Lot 305 - Footwear Comparison	£1,501.56
Lot 311a - Simple Toxicology/RTA	£8,114.91
Lot 312 - Casework	£34,070.05
Firearms & Ammunition	£6,751.63
Lot 313 - Marks & Traces	£3,668.50
*	
PACE DNA	£63,945.41
Tox and RTA	£15,580.84
General Case Work	£10,090.92
Question Documents	£2,293.07
*	
Lot 302 - Other Crime Stains	£7,597.22
Lot 303 - Other DNA	£165,030.55
Lot 304 - Fire Investigation	£5,448.10

Pencadlys yr Heddlu,
Glan-y-Don, Bae Colwyn LL29 8AW
www.heddlugogleddcymru.police.uk

Police Headquarters,
Glan-y-Don, Colwyn Bay LL29 8AW
www.northwales.police.uk

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Lot 312 - Casework	£34,008.77
PACE	£87.91
Lot 311a - Simple Toxicology/RTA	£46,847.33
Environmental Testing	£7,706.80
Anthropology/Archaeology	£761.25
Specialist Support	£574.58
Scene Attendance	£500.00
*	
Toxicology	£390,938.00
Courier	£215.60
Total	£998,065.25

* Concerns have been raised in relation to providing the names of digital forensic laboratories and/or outside forensic science services used. Therefore, a public Interest Test has been carried out to weigh up the reasons for and against disclosure; to ensure the release is in the interest of the public as a whole and not just the applicant.

Section s31(1)(a)(b) Law Enforcement

Section 31 (1)(a)(b) is a prejudice based qualified exemption, therefore there is a requirement to articulate the harm that would be caused in confirming or not that the information is held as well as carrying out a public interest test.

The Harm Test process requires North Wales Police to consider any possible harm that might arise as a result of placing the requested information into the public domain. This process considers the potential harm to:

- Individuals
- The community as a whole
- North Wales Police and the wider policing service
- Other bodies

Policing is an information-led activity, and information assurance (which includes information security) is fundamental to how the Police Service manages the challenges faced. In order to comply with statutory requirements, the College of Policing Authorised Professional Practice for Information Assurance has been put in place to ensure the delivery of core operational policing by providing appropriate and consistent protection for the information assets of member organisations, see below link:

<https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/information-management/>

Commercial Forensic Service Providers are vitally important in the Criminal Justice system - not only do they play a crucial role by supporting UK Policing with backlogs in the Digital Forensics arena, but they provide Defence teams with access to independent forensic experts to support their clients.

Whilst not in any way questioning the motives of the applicant, it must be taken into account when considering potential harm that a disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 is made to the world at large, rather than a private correspondence. Specific details of any forensic service providers used by North Wales Police would be extremely useful to those involved in criminality as it would enable them to create a map of those most used by police Forces. Forensic Service Providers can be targeted by malicious actors, for example in 2019 Eurofins (one of the UK's largest FSPs) suffered a highly sophisticated ransomware attack which severely disrupted UK Policing and the Criminal Justice system.

<https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2019/06/24/eurofins-ransomware-attack/>
<https://www.theguardian.com/science/2019/jul/05/eurofins-ransomware-attack-hacked-forensic-provider-pays-ransom>

By providing a list of forensic service providers, Force by Force, a malign individual could identify those most critical to the Law-and-Order sector and specifically target those providing the most assistance. This would have a huge impact on the effective delivery of operational law enforcement as it would leave companies open to further cyberattacks which could have devastating consequences for law enforcement.

Factors favouring Disclosure

Confirming the names of Forensic Service Providers would be of interest to the public, namely give insight into the forensic processes used to solve crimes.

Factors favouring Non-Disclosure

Measures are put in place to protect the community we serve and as evidenced within the harm, to provide a detailed list of Forensic Service Providers would allow individuals intent on disrupting law enforcement to target specific companies using the information obtained to maximise the impact.

Taking into account the current security climate within the United Kingdom, and the Eurofins cyber-attack, no information which may aid criminality should be disclosed. It is clear that it would have an impact on a Force's ability to carry out the core duty of enforcing the law and serving the community.

The public entrust the Police Service to make appropriate decisions with regard to their safety and protection and the only way of reducing risk is to be cautious with what is placed into the public domain.

Balance Test

The Police Service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. In order to effectively and robustly carry out those duties, external services are utilised which are vital to investigating criminal activity. Weakening the mechanisms used to investigate any type of criminal activity would have a detrimental impact on law enforcement as a whole. To provide the names of the FSPs despite the known risks of cyber-attacks would undermine any trust or confidence the public have in the Police Service. Therefore, at this moment in time, it is our opinion that the balance test favours against the disclosure of the FSP used for digital forensics.

In accordance with the Freedom of Information Act 2000, this letter acts as a Refusal Notice under section 17 (1) of the legislation.

THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST
UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000, AND IS CORRECT AS AT 03/09/2025

OFFICIAL



FOI Reference: 828/2025

Request

I am writing to you under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 to request the following information for the most recent financial year for which data is available:

Please provide the total amount in £ (excluding VAT) that your force has spent on external physical (traditional) forensic science services. Do not include any spend on digital forensics. I request that this is broken down into categories based on the Lot Code and description specified in the contract(s) awarded to your private forensic science provider suppliers.

For each category, please include:

1. The Lot Code (as per the contract)
2. The Lot description (e.g., DNA Crime Stains)
3. The total spend (£, ex VAT)
4. The supplier name

For example:

Lot X | DNA Crime Stains | £1,000,000 | Eurofins Forensic Services

Lot Y | Toxicology | £500,000 | Cellmark Forensic Services

Response

I can confirm that Dyfed-Powys Police does hold the information requested, as outlined below:-

1 April 2024 - 31 March 2025

DPP	L301 PACE DNA	L302 Crime Scene DNA	L303 Casework DNA	L304 Fire Investigation	L307 Drugs	L311a Toxicology (RTA)	L311b Toxicology (Casework)	L312 Casework	L313 M&T	TOTAL
CELLMARK	£53,788	£0	£124,729	£27,681	£0	£90,200	£30,373	£88,140	£4,196	£419,107
EUROFINS	£0	£0	£0	£15,277	£0	£0	£10,363	£0	£0	£25,640
KEY	£0	£70,695	£111,039	£0	£29,426	£38,441	£0	£23,647	£3,774	£277,022
SOCOTEC	£0	£0	£0	£0	£14,940	£0	£0	£0	£0	£14,940
TOTAL	£53,788	£70,695	£235,768	£42,958	£44,366	£128,641	£40,736	£111,787	£7,970	£736,709

It should be noted that as a result of the systems adopted by Dyfed-Powys Police in relation to the recording of such information that the information released may or may not be accurate

(This is a response under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and disclosed on 02/09/2025)

[REDACTED]

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox [REDACTED]
Sent: 18 July 2023 13:01
Subject: Log No.000824/23 CRU Circulation (18/07/2023) - Including Advice
Attachments: Log No.987/21 CRU Circulation (19/07/2021) - [REDACTED] - OS

OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

Please see below advice in relation to the following:

Log Number:824/23

Case worker:[REDACTED]

Logged with:National

Sent from:[REDACTED]

Applicants Request

- 1. The number of digital forensic examinations carried out by in-house, police forensic services in the past 12 months or similar reporting period*
- 2. The number of digital forensic examinations carried by outside laboratories and/or outside forensic science services in the same period*
- 3. The names of any digital forensic laboratories and/or outside forensic science services used*
- 4. The current backlog of digital forensic examinations*
- 5. The number of Forensic Science Activities, in accordance with the Forensic Science Regulator Act 2021, that you are / are not currently accredited to deliver*
- 6. The number of Forensic Science Activities completed in laboratories which are not accredited to ISO 17025.*

CRU Advice

Our apologies for the current delays.

Thank you to the those forces who have provided information relevant to this request. Overall, there is no reason not to comply with the request and confirm or deny information is held. But where information is held for **Q3, our advice is not to disclose the names of any outsourced digital forensic laboratories.**

To explain that further, at Q3 the applicant asks about both digital forensics labs, and other outside forensic science services. We have no overriding concerns in confirming if your force has used forensic science services for trace/wet forensics, and naming the provider. However, when it comes to digital forensics practitioners will recall the national stance is **not to name the provider, and exempt the information**

under s31(1) Law Enforcement. This is set out in the advice provided for CRU 987/21, a copy of which is attached, and remains extant. A form of words for the harm and PIT is also provided to assist.

We so no immediate harm in the remaining questions, but should your own checks cause you concern, then please refer back to the CRU for further assistance if required.

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]
National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)

National Police Chiefs' Council
[REDACTED]

This email contains information which is confidential and may also be privileged. It is for the exclusive use of the addressee(s) and any views or opinions expressed within are those of the originator and not necessarily those of the Force. If you are not the intended recipient(s) please note that any form of distribution, copying or use of this email or the information contained is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error please forward a copy to informationsecurity@thamesvalley.police.uk and to the sender. Please then delete the email and destroy any copies of it. DO NOT use this email address for other enquiries as it will not be responded to, nor any action taken upon it. If you have a non-urgent enquiry, please call the Police non-emergency number 101. If it is an emergency, please call 999. Thank you.

NPFDU CRU Referral Guidance and Form

In order for the NPFDU CRU to deliver its remit, forces and partners must refer certain requests so the unit can centrally assess. Please carefully read the following to allow the team to respond as promptly and as accurately as possible.

All mandatory referrals and requests for specific disclosure advice must come via a completed referral form emailed to [REDACTED] Please note incomplete forms will be returned.

- Mandatory referrals take priority and will be prioritised over general advice questions. The unit must ensure mandatory referral advice is in line with national guidance and respond promptly to enable forces to do similar.
- In addition to these mandatory referrals, any FOI/EIR requests that require specific disclosure and/or technical advice can be sent to the above email address with a completed form.
- Once an FOI referral has been received, we will generate an e-mail which will confirm its URN. This message may also contain further instructions which must be complied with before further guidance can be issued.
- Any request referred must **not** be answered until a final response has been received from the NPFDU CRU, unless otherwise stated from the team. If your force is considering making a disclosure prior to advice being issued or if it does not intend to follow national guidance, please make contact as soon as possible.
- The team aim to respond within the SLA of 10 working days, if the team are unable to, you will be notified. The team cannot prioritise a referral because it has been sent in late from a force. Please use our drop in sessions if appropriate.

Please note some additional questions have been added to the referral form below. It is important these are answered in as much detail as possible. If not, or left blank, the team will return the form and ask for further information before responding. This will assist the NPFDU in providing informative, consistent and accurate advice in a timely manner and to prevent delays to our service.

It is encouraged that general advice on the referral process or a simple FOI/EIR technical query is best resolved via a call to the team on [REDACTED] (works via MS Teams also) or attend a weekly drop in session on Tuesday or Thursday anytime between 11am-1130am via this MS Teams Link.

[Join the meeting now](#)

Meeting ID: [REDACTED]

The Team may still request a referral form after initial consultation.

Mandatory Referrals-By Subject Area	
Subject	Further Detail
Witness protection/protected persons.	Ultra high risk subject area which must be referred to CRU.
Requests which name and/or relate to information which MAY originate from any of the S23 bodies.	[REDACTED]
Covert operations, use of informants or surveillance activities or tactics.	Ultra high risk subject area which must be referred to CRU.
New programmes or software products such as Data Platforms/systems/tools for operational purposes.	Requests relating to operational products (whether being piloted, trialled or implemented or not), including engagement with new software companies that predominately handle big data such as 'Briefcam', 'Palantir'. Referrals are not required for back office functions such as AI Chatbot, crime prediction tools etc. If known please inform the CRU of the operational context of the product e.g. AI analysing digital evidence
Counter terrorism (incl Prevent, Pursue, Protect, Prepare) and/or national security material or operations.	Includes SB, CTU, CBRN, port or airport operations, Crowded Spaces and ANPR.
VIP/Royalty Protection.	To include high profile Royal events and visits.
Information received from or which relates to certain partner agencies. <i>Referral only required once established information is captured by the request.*</i>	Includes NPCC, any government department, IOPC, CPS and College of Policing.
Major or complex incidents or major investigations or operations.*	Examples such as extremist protests, <u>large</u> scale public disorder, multiple or high profile unexplained deaths, cross border incidents. Will also include national operations and Inquiries. Please contact the CRU if unsure. <i>Local investigations/operations do not need referring.</i>
International Relations	Includes international training, visiting overseas dignitaries & FCO equities where s27 may be engaged.
National Security	Requests requiring s24 will need stakeholder consideration
Notification of ICO complaint, First Tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal activity	
Requests with potentially significant reputational implications, e.g. the storage of human tissue.	Where national policing leads would welcome the opportunity to comment on high profile matters (if unsure please contact the CRU)
Requests for information held for the purpose of a statutory Inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005	Examples – UCPI, Manchester Arena, Death of Dawn Sturgess, Grenfell

***If a request is captured by previous NPFDU guidance within the past 12 months, then no referral is required.**

Temporary Mandatory Referrals	
Subject	Date added
Operation LESTE - requests in relation to the response to immigration related protest other than those requests asking for statistical data such as arrests, officer numbers, costs etc. for which the agreed stance remains.	19/08/25

Request concerning local decision making can remain with forces unless specific advice is required or s23 and s24 are considered redactions.	
Any requests in relation to crimes committed by asylum seekers that may have a national impact and are not purely statistical.	19/08/25
Casey Report into Group based CSE and abuse – requests relating the Casey report, Operation Beaconport, and grooming gangs. No requirement to refer if similar request has already been submitted.	06/08/25
Trump Visit – Requests concerning forces mutual aid for President Trumps visit to Scotland and following State visit in September	23/07/25
Mutual Aid request with regards protest activity across the country	23/07/25
Supreme court ruling on biological sex. This refers to requests which relate specifically to the supreme court ruling on biological sex and information linked to protected characteristics data recording (both workforce and those who come into contact with the police), and single sex spaces i.e. toilets	15/05/25

There is no requirement to refer if the information requested is already officially published 'Officially published' includes, MAPPA reports and websites such as OSC, The College of Policing, NPCC, Government, IOPC, PCC, Police.UK or Force websites, or documents already marked as suitable for publication under FOIA 2000.

NPFDU CRU Referral Form

PLEASE COMPLETE ALL THE BELOW FIELDS TO ENSURE ACCURATE & TIMELY ADVICE, IT IS GREATLY APPRECIATED. THANK YOU

Force reference number:	2025/874
Date request received:	12/09/2025
Type of request:	Initial ☐ Internal ☒ Review Appeal ☐ Tribunal ☐ (delete as appropriate) If at IR or appeal stage please provide sight of previous responses and requestors comments.
Applicants Name for reference	[REDACTED]
Actual wording of request	I appreciate the concern regarding identifying providers however police forces neighbouring yours have had no such concerns, I'd like to ask you to reconsider considering that the identities of FSPs are in the public domain therefore disclosing the identity in answering this FOI can not place them at risk. Attached are FOI responses from Gwent and Dyfed Powys by means of example. Original request: I am writing to you under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 to request the following information for the most recent financial year for which data is available: Please provide the total amount in £ (excluding VAT) that your force has spent on external physical (traditional) forensic science services. Do not include any spend on digital forensics. I request that this is broken down into categories based on the Lot Code and description specified in the contract(s) awarded to your private forensic science provider suppliers. For each category, please include: 1. The Lot Code (as per the contract) 2. The Lot description (e.g., DNA Crime Stains) 3. The total spend (£, ex VAT) 4. The supplier name For example: Lot X DNA Crime Stains £1,000,000 Eurofins Forensic Services Lot Y Toxicology £500,000 Cellmark Forensic Services If possible, please provide the information in an electronic spreadsheet

	format (e.g., CSV or XLSX).
Reason for referral	Non mandatory advice – please state why advice needed
Specific advice required	<i>For info delete when completing</i> For non-mandatory referrals please specify why it has been referred and what advice is needed.
Is it a valid request (S8)	<i>For info delete when completing</i> Please seek clarification before sending to the CRU.
Do you know what information you hold? Please provide as much detail as possible. Is the information retrievable within 18 hours, is s12 a consideration?	YES: ☒ NO: ☐
What views and opinions are held by the FOI team and Business leads?	North Wales Police hold all the data requested however, we followed previous advice and exempted the information under Section 31. Is this still the stance we should be taking? Or can we no release the names of the supplied as the other Welsh forces have done?
Person dealing with request and contact number:	

From: Freedom of Information Team
Sent: 05 September 2025 13:47
To: NPCC CRU Mailbox
Subject: RE: CRU reference: 01/CRF/25/005123/X - Request logged - Plasan Sandcat Tigris armoured vehicles - Advice to Follow

Categories: [REDACTED]

Good Afternoon,

Would it be possible to have an update on the below advice as our response was due out yesterday.

Many thanks,



[REDACTED]
Swyddog Hawliau Gwybodaeth | Information Rights Officer
Sicrwydd gwybodaeth | Information Assurance
Heddlu Gogledd Cymru | North Wales Police
[REDACTED]



Yn gwneud Gogledd Cymru'r lle mwyaf diogel i fyw, gweithio ac ymweld yn y DU
Making North Wales the safest place to live, work and visit in the UK

Rydym yn croesawu gohebiaeth yn y Gymraeg a'r Saesneg – byddwn yn ymateb yn gyfartal i'r ddau ac yn ateb yn eich dewis iaith heb oedi.
We welcome correspondence in Welsh and English – we will respond equally to both and will reply in your language of choice without delay.

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox [REDACTED]
Sent: 08 August 2025 07:15
Subject: CRU reference: 01/CRF/25/005123/X - Request logged - Plasan Sandcat Tigris armoured vehicles - Advice to Follow

Dear All,

The below FOI request has now been logged in the CRU and will be treated as a national request. Advice will be sent to all forces in due course. **Please note we do not require confirmation that it has been received by your force.**

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005123/X
Referred by: Derbyshire Police, Lancashire Constabulary
Sent from: [REDACTED]

The Applicant name is included in the acknowledgement email as a reference for forces only, any future correspondence will only quote the CRU reference number. Please do not duplicate the applicant name in any future correspondence and use only the CRU reference number

Applicant's request:

Please provide information held by your force regarding the procurement and use of Plasan Sandcat Tigris armoured vehicles (including any variant referred to as "Sandcat").

1. Procurement activity (October 2023 – present)

- a) The number of Sandcat Tigris (or Sandcat variant) vehicles ordered.
- b) The number of such vehicles delivered and currently held by the force.
- c) Please confirm explicitly if no such vehicles have been ordered, delivered, or are planned for purchase.

2. Operational status

- a) Of any vehicles acquired, how many are available for deployment?
- b) How many are not available for deployment (for example, undergoing modifications, repair, or awaiting approval)?

If you consider releasing this information to be exempt under Section 31 (Law Enforcement) or any other FOIA exemption, please still release all other requested information and provide your reasoning and the outcome of the public interest test.

3. Financial expenditure

- a) The total cost (including VAT and any associated modifications, fittings, or logistics) for all Sandcat Tigris (or Sandcat variant) vehicles purchased in the above period.
- b) If vehicles were ordered but payment is not yet complete, please confirm the current status of payments.

4. Supplier/ procurement route

- a) For each purchase, please confirm whether it was made directly from Plasan Sasa Ltd or via the UK distributor Ricardo UK Ltd.
- b) If supplier details are considered exempt under Section 43 (commercial interests) or Section 31 (law enforcement), please still release all other requested information and explain the exemption applied, including the public interest test outcome.

Kind regards,

[Redacted]
Management Assistant
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs' Council

[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]



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[Redacted]

From: Freedom of Information Team
Sent: 18 September 2025 13:56
To: [Redacted]
Subject: FW: CRU ref: 25/5194/M - DVI - Including Advice
Attachments: 2025-907 Disaster Victim Identification.docx

Good Afternoon

Attached is our proposed response.

Thanks

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

From: Freedom of Information Team
Sent: 25 September 2025 07:22
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: North wales : OS - CRU 25/5320 CSE data

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox <[REDACTED]>
Sent: 25 September 2025 07:01
Subject: OS - CRU 25/5320 CSE data

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

The Applicant name is included in the acknowledgement email as a reference for forces only, any future correspondence will only quote the CRU reference number. Please do not duplicate the applicant name in any future correspondence and use only the CRU reference number

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU on 24/9/25. **Please let us know if you have received it.**

Initial advice is below.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005320/A
Referred by: Gwent
Applicant: [REDACTED]

Applicant's request:

Primary request: record-level dataset

Please provide record-level (row-by-row) data for all CSE-related crimes in your force area for each calendar year 2010–2024 inclusive (and 2025 year-to-date if available).

A) Scope / definition

- Confirm the operational definition of “Child Sexual Exploitation (CSE)” and whether you use a CSE flag/marker.*
- If no CSE flag exists, please state which Home Office offence codes or crime classifications you use to identify CSE offences (e.g., grooming, arranging/facilitating child sexual offences, sexual communication with a child, controlling child prostitution/indecency, etc.).*

B) Requested dataset fields (record-level, anonymised)

For each relevant record, please include:

- Year of offence/record*
- Crime classification/offence code*
- Outcome code (Home Office outcome type, with description if available)*
- Arrest made (Y/N)*
- Suspect sex (M/F/Other/Unknown)*

- *Suspect ethnicity (classification used by force)*
- *Suspect nationality (if recorded; if not, state “not recorded”)*
- *Suspect religion (if recorded; if not, state “not recorded”)*
- *CPS referral (Y/N)*
- *CPS charging decision (if recorded by police)*

C) Format

- *Please supply data in machine-readable CSV with a data dictionary (field definitions, code lists, outcome descriptions).*
- *Remove any direct personal identifiers (names, DOB, addresses, case numbers).*

Fallback request: aggregated data

If providing the above record-level dataset would:

- *exceed the s.12 cost limit,*
- *or be refused under s.40 (personal information) or s.31 (law enforcement),*

then please instead provide annual aggregated totals for 2010–2024 (and 2025 YTD):

- 1. Number of recorded crimes meeting your CSE definition.*
- 2. Outcomes for those crimes by Home Office outcome type.*
- 3. Number of arrests of suspects, broken down by:*
 - o Sex (M/F/Other/Unknown)*
 - o Ethnicity (force’s classification)*
 - o Nationality (if recorded)*
 - o Religion (if recorded)*
- 4. Number of CPS referrals for charging decisions.*
- 5. CPS charging decisions recorded by police (Charge/Alternative charge/No further action/Out of court/etc.).*

Assistance

- *If full coverage from 2010 is not available, please provide data from the earliest year held.*
- *If any field is not held, please confirm explicitly (s.1(1)(a)).*
- *If partial data is possible, please release what you hold and advise under s.16 how to refine further.*

I confirm I am requesting only non-identifiable information for research purposes

CRU Advice:

The start of the request is for a definition of CSE, and we suspect forces will be using the definition as can be found via the College of Policing at [Responding to child sexual exploitation | College of Policing](#).

Next, the applicant is asking for single record data across annual periods from 2010 onwards, which is likely to result in most forces establishing this to be excess Cost under s12.

But further down the request the applicant addresses that s12 will be the likely outcome and provides a refined request, which is still likely to exceed Cost even though they require aggregated data as opposed to single record data.

However, putting excess Cost to one side, practitioners would need to locally assess the data and determine whether it is capable to leading to the identification of any individual, or would otherwise compromise a live investigation if given out (sections 40 and 31 respectively).

Overall, in the event s12 is not relevant, please let us know if we can assist you further. We welcome sight of any draft responses where disclosure is being considered so we can understand how the data might look. But at present we are not suggesting a partial NCND s23(3). However, this may well be taken into further consideration.

Kind regards,



Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs Council



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[REDACTED]

From: Freedom of Information Team
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: North wales : CRU reference: 01/CRF/25/005142/A - Request logged - DPIA's - Advice to Follow

From: Freedom of Information Team
Sent: 13 August 2025 07:43
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: North wales : CRU reference: 01/CRF/25/005142/A - Request logged - DPIA's - Advice to Follow

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox <[REDACTED]>
Sent: 12 August 2025 11:07
Subject: CRU reference: 01/CRF/25/005142/A - Request logged - DPIA's - Advice to Follow

Dear All,

The below FOI request has now been logged in the CRU and will be treated as a national request. Advice will be sent to all forces in due course.

Please note we do not require confirmation that it has been received by your force.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005142/A
Referred by: South Wales Police
Sent from: [REDACTED]

The Applicant name is included in the acknowledgement email as a reference for forces only, any future correspondence will only quote the CRU reference number. Please do not duplicate the applicant name in any future correspondence and use only the CRU reference number

Applicant's request:

- A complete list of Data Protection Impact Assessments produced by your force in the past five years.

Kind Regards

[REDACTED]

Management Assistant
National Police FOI & DP Unit (NPFDU) | National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC)



See the [NPCC Data Sharing Hub](#) for guidance, templates & a full list of national agreements

[REDACTED]

From: Freedom of Information Team
Sent: 22 September 2025 10:37
To: 'NPCC CRU Mailbox'
Subject: RE: Request to Update FOI Contact Information

Good Morning,

The details for North Wales;

Head of FOI - [REDACTED]
SPOC - [REDACTED]
SPOC - [REDACTED]
Team - freedomofinformationteam@northwales.police.uk

Regards
[REDACTED]

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox [REDACTED]
Sent: 19 September 2025 16:13
Subject: Request to Update FOI Contact Information

Good afternoon everyone,

It looks like our current FOI contact lists are a little out of date and need refreshing.

Could you please provide the following details by **Friday 3rd October**:

- Name of FOI Head and/or FOI Single Point of Contact (SPOC) for your force
- Relevant email address(es) – please do not provide the FOI team's generic email

This information will help NPFDU share targeted updates and key communications more effectively.

Thank you in advance for your support.

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]
Management Assistant
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit

[REDACTED]

